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Abstract
This project examines American scholar W.E.B.’s DuBois’ idea of “double consciousness”,
from his book The Souls of Black Folk (1903). The idea of “double consciousness” has and
continues to be utilized by Black scholars and artists in literary, theoretical, and
psychological contexts, some of which I hope my paper will adequately survey. I begin by
examining “double consciousness” from the perspective of particulars by understanding Du
Bois’s original idea and the specificities of the American context he himself was a part of and
wrote of, considering the legacy of slavery. Then, by focusing primarily on writers such as
Frantz Fanon, Richard Wright and Paul Gilroy, succeeding Du Bois, the paper will discuss
the various subtleties of “doubleness” present in these works and how they can be crossreferenced to other historical and cultural movements. Framing this discussion in light of
“double consciousness” as a “gift” or potential ability versus as a purely restrictive
experience demonstrates how the antimonies of “doubleness” works to disprove specific
kinds of dualism. Inadvertently the paper will advocate the need for a change in dialectics to
centralize Black notions of Being into an academic tradition that has historically limited the
definition of humanity.
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Summary for Lay Audience
This paper attempts to explore an idea created by activist and academic W.E.B. Du Bois, first
written in his 1903 book The Souls of Black Folk. The idea, called “double consciousness”
describes the experience of living in racist society where one feels both “Black” and
“American”. On the one hand, the individual is made aware of their race through being
perceived in a certain way by mainstream American society which considers “whiteness” the
default. On the other hand, the individual had only known life in America and had been
disconnected from their heritage. Using this idea, the paper looks at how Du Bois used the
idea in his life and work and the way it was adapted by other thinkers after him. I discuss
how some see “double consciousness” as an ability with great power but at the same time an
experience that can greatly limit one’s freedom. In light of this, I look at and consider the
history that “double consciousness” is tied to (Slavery) and how this particular experience is
related to other kinds of oppression.
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Preface
I began the research and conception of this thesis two years ago, at a time when Black
scholars and activists continued to labour the task of recognizing and dismantling systemic
racism on all fronts, both in North America and across the globe. As a student approaching
this subject, I did not foresee that I would finish my project during the midst of a revolution
in the form of the 2020 protests sparked by the murder of George Floyd and systemic
racialized police brutality, which grew to encompass the social and economic disparity based
on race in the United States and the world. In my experience of witnessing these events (from
a place of immense privilege), I watched the arms race to control the narrative of these
movements and how they were perceived. I did not have to read a news article to hear early
on about the horrors of the “looting and violence” of protestors that had been posed as the
main injustice, rather the murders. This was widely accepted too, until confronting ideas and
information made their way to the collective consciousnesses. Even if for only a short time,
questions were brought up not only on the methods of institutions such as policing; but
questioning the roots of this institution and the very role of it altogether. The first view did
not cease to exist; nor has the plight of the protestors, or the tragic loss of life. And right
before our eyes, we are witnessing the interconnectedness of the many narratives that had
been carefully instilled for many centuries, as a kind of inheritance.
Figures like William Edward Burghardt (W.E.B.) Du Bois and his successors that I discuss in
this paper had to take on the challenge existing in the same narrative that denied the
humanity of Black folk in different ways, looking at the world past and present in order to
show the manifestation of this. The idea of “double consciousness” as methodology (as well
viii

as a way of being) that was embodied in the task of these thinkers and thinkers today has
been largely ignored in academic traditions like philosophy and critical theory. The ideas of
Black these thinkers (such as double consciousness) are closely related (and sometimes the
unacknowledged foundations) of notions from thinkers that are important to Western
European thought. Yet these ideas should not be studies for what they can bring to the
hegemony of the academic institution (as they sometimes are) but as crucial to confront the
indissoluble memory of slavery and racial violence that is still present.
I state only my subjective experience of the events of the Summer of 2020, and as a person of
Canadian settler colonialism descent, I wish to always be reminded of the privilege and bias
that my words, actions and perspective holds. Yet as a member of the academic community, I
feel it is the urgent responsibility of myself and each person to whole heartedly commit to not
only addressing racism of the present, but the foundational inheritance of knowledge that
allowed for senseless and continual fatality (in both a literal and metaphoric way). As a
student of the “humanities”, we must admit that until the violence towards Black (and other
racialized people) ends, we do not have a clue of what humanity is.
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Chapter 1

1

The Metaphysical Legacy of W.E.B. Du Bois

To begin my thesis, the goal of my first chapter, ultimately, is to explore to what extent
certain ideas about race can be placed into spatial, temporal, geographical and historical
categories; and to explore the significance of their transcendence beyond these.
Throughout this thesis and specifically this chapter I will take a metaphysical approach to
the phenomenology of race, by examining the various traditions that have emerged in
critical race theory, stemming directly and indirectly from American sociologist and
thinker W.E.B. Du Bois and specifically his theory of “double-consciousness”.

1.1

Embodying Genre: Coming to Know Du Bois’
Methodology

The reason I wish to take this approach, is to look at the way a figure such as Du Bois
(among others), in the study of not only his ideas but his life, demonstrates the power in
fragmentation of his idea. In chapters Two and Three, I explore some of the subtle ways
that this idea embodies the various kinds of splits, not only metaphysically, but
geographically and otherwise. As I will elaborate more fully in the last chapter, academic
Paul Gilroy describes Du Bois as someone with a “lack of roots” (117). It is not that he
did not have knowledge of where he came from (in fact, Du Bois’ family tree is much
more well known then many other Black Americans). However, when Gilroy describes
Du Bois in this way, he means to signify that Du Bois’ existential mission (or burden) is
not to be confined by a certain legacy, whether biographically or intellectually. I would
like my thesis to be a reflection of his life—beginning with the idea of where he was
born, then branching into the confusion of finding oneself amongst various inflictions and
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ideologies (reflecting his travels to Europe), and finally ending in a place with a message
of liberation (reflecting the end of his life in Africa).
It may be helpful to understand how Du Bois is regarded by a few relevant thinkers. He is
clearly a major influence for the thinkers discussed in this paper, certainly for Frantz
Fanon, Paul Gilroy and contemporary “Afro-Pessimist” thinkers. He is recognized by
Martin Luther King Jr., who gave a speech during a politically intense time in honour of
Du Bois. As Martin Halpern conveys in “Honoring Dr. Du Bois: Martin Luther King's
most radical speech”, King reinstates the importance of Du Bois’ work in a historical
context and said “Du Bois fought the oppressor with his many gifts” (Halpern 41). The
idea of “gifts” is an interesting choice of words considering Du Bois’ ideas about “gifts”
which will be discussed later in this chapter. However, when considering all the
influences that Du Bois had, from different subjects and contexts, King’s statement rings
true—Du Bois was able to combine knowledge from different sources yet achieve a
product that does not feel disassociated. His work does not go without criticism, but
despite the short time it had been around before the Civil Rights era, it had already made
a lasting impact.
An example of Du Bois’s abilities actually come from outside the framework of the
humanities or social sciences. It is little known that Du Bois also did incredible research
in the medical field. In “After 121 Years, It’s Time to Recognize W.E.B. Du Bois as a
founding Father of Social Epidemiology” (2018), Sharon D. Jones and Lorraine T. Dean
explore this often “underappreciated” area of his work, which analyzes inequality in
medical care due to racism. This topic is coming to light as more questions are being
asked addressing medical bias in the present medical care system. As the authors of this

3

article assert, Du Bois’ work is often “unacknowledged” in the field of epidemiology,
despite doing extensive work on the issue (Jones & Dean 232). Even though medicine
has evolved very much in the past century, these researchers placing Du Bois as a central
figure provides a way forward to address racial inequality in medicine, and the same can
be done in the humanities. Furthermore, Du Bois’ medical research not only shows the
breadth of subjects he was able to draw upon in his work, but his great ability to
understand the past in order to look ahead.
Even as more of his underappreciated work is acknowledged, his main sociological work
and its ongoing potential is still disputed. In the book The Scholar Denied: W.E.B. Du
Bois and the Birth of Modern Sociology (2015), Aldorn Morris argues this very idea. As
Patricia Collins summarizes in “Du Bois’ Contested Legacy” (her critique of the book):
"Morris's main argument is simple – racism kept Du Bois out of professional sociology,
thus denying American sociology access to one of its most significant founders” (Collins
1398). She criticizes Morris’ for overemphasizing in claiming how much influence Du
Bois might have had, had he gone the institutional route—and not been stunted by the
politics of the university. Additionally, she criticizes Morris on the basis of overreaching
the impact that one person could have on changing the entire trajectory of an established
discipline, especially given the barriers Du Bois faced. Finally, she points out the lack of
awareness of intersectionality in Morris’ argument, crediting Du Bois for work that Black
feminists have done and have received even less recognition for than Du Bois. Collins’
goal is not to discount Du Bois’ work, or Morris’ claim that it should be more central in
sociology.
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However, Collins does bring up a very important issue that plagues the controversy
around not only Du Bois or even something as specific to sociology or critical theory.
One of the main problems that Collins has with Morris’ claims is described as follows:
The Scholar Denied is based on a core premise that a sociological canon exists
that is organized via a metaphor of family lineage. We pay homage to founding
fathers or masters of intellectual households whose ideas are perceived as seminal
to the emergence of our disciplines.” (Collins 1406)
Collins eloquently describes here the current dysfunction in attempting to combat racism
(and sexism) in any established academic or intellectual discipline. In both of the above
attempts (Morris’ but also Jones and Dean’s) to reinstate Du Bois’s ideas into a given
discipline (sociology and epidemiology respectively)—the tone is concerned not only
with using and recognizing Du Bois’ ideas but also fitting him in with other (male)
“founding fathers” to pay homage to before innovating from this foundation. Such
attempts are understandable, given the history of denied access to these worlds, but
Collins and other Black feminists dare to ask the uncomfortable question of whether this
paternal linkage should be the goal at all.
In many ways Du Bois makes the perfect person to add to this legacy, to a list of those
that forged the way in questions of how to address social or cultural issues pertaining to
race. The breadth of his knowledge may be the very reason why he himself seems to be
discussed almost more frequently than his work. However, keeping Collin’s critique in
mind as well as Du Bois’ own “outsider” status, his “lack of roots” allowed him to
innovate in a way that clearly still resonates with many today. He unapologetically drew
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from Western sources while embracing a Pan-African agenda. Despite the problems
inherent to our academic institutions, Du Bois’ approach is something to be embraced.

1.2

An American Scholar

Du Bois certainly is in many ways a “global scholar”, at the same time that The Souls of
Black Folk (1903) has a deeply American quality. In a paradoxical way, this American
quality can be a starting place amongst the diversity when considering the topics at hand.
What precisely is so appealing about looking at American texts in this context is that the
theme of “American-ness” is already there, undeniably woven both into the political and
personal landscape of the American psyche. Before witnessing this inseparable identity
expressed in theory, one may first witness it in art, specifically poetry. Poetry and theory
are similar in that they both make sense of chaotic cultural patterns, allowing the reader
to look through one tiny window of possibility and clarity—or at least the convincing
appearance of clarity. Therefore, one may look to look to a poet’s words, and the reality
they are trying to portray through them, to get an idea of the essence—or appearance of
essence—about a certain group (Americans in this case).
Walt Whitman (1819-1892), for example, was deemed “America’s Poet” in part because
of the way his poems paint a proud and nationalistic picture of the white working class at
the time. Critics debate whether still where Whitman’s views on race stand, some hold
him up to an egalitarian ideal of a man who was anti-slavery which went against the grain
of his time. Others portray him as a product of his time, in terms of his attitude toward the
oppression of African Americans in enforcing racist stereotypes. His celebration of a
blue-collared working life (in such works as “America” and “I Hear America Singing”),
combined with his famous “celebration of himself,” can be seen as part of the history in
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the formation of a unique identity to white Americans. Even his now infamous form of
verse refused to follow old European poetic traditions for the sake of forming a new one;
suggesting he sought to make his vision of “American-ness” a part of the cultural
patrimony he believed to be forging.
This thesis is not about Walt Whitman, or his poems, but I bring him up to help articulate
an important moment of the longstanding history of American race relations. Returning
to the idea of consciousness, it becomes more and more evident that the first person voice
in Whitman’s poems, whether he speaks as himself or someone else, seems to give the
impression of ultimate freedom to associate or disassociate with any part of the American
society, and of, ultimately, possessing the ability to exist as an entity free of any labels.
For the soul that inhabits the voice in Whitman’s poems, the presence of one’s body is a
conscious decision, rather than a sentence to be forever treated and grouped into a certain
category. As Whitman writes in “I Sing the Body Electric” (1855):
The voice, articulation, language, whispering, shouting aloud,
Food, drink, pulse, digestion, sweat, sleep, walking, swimming,
Poise on the hips, leaping, reclining, embracing, arm-curving and tightening,
The continual changes of the flex of the mouth, and around the eyes,
The skin, the sunburnt shade, freckles, hair,
The curious sympathy one feels when feeling with the hand the naked meat of the
body,
The circling rivers the breath, and breathing it in and out,
The beauty of the waist, and thence of the hips, and thence downward toward the
knees,

7

The thin red jellies within you or within me, the bones and the marrow in the
bones,
The exquisite realization of health;
O I say these are not the parts and poems of the body only, but of the soul,
O I say now these are the soul! (Whitman, 9.25-35)
Here, the body (of a white subject) is separated into parts, and actions in which the
discovery of what the body can do is treated as a luxury, (i.e. “the exquisite realization of
health”). This is not the same ekphrasis used to describe the physical attributes of a
woman in a Woodsworth sonnet, in fact gender is not exclusively mentioned at all. The
relationship between connecting the body to the soul is done callously so; as if the subject
can discover their body freely. The skin is just that, skin with no prior attached
connotations. The celebration of the human form in Whitman’s poem actually avoids
specificity; he avoids describing any one body part in a way that suggests diversity. One
of the only references to a particular attribute to differentiate between bodies is directly
about skin tone, celebrating the inclusivity of all white bodies, and all white souls.
The sentiment which Whitman illustrates here, as “America’s Poet”, clearly resonates
with many white Americans, and is much different to the relationship to the self and body
that W.E.B. Du Bois writes about in The Souls of Black Folk (1903). There are
similarities between the idea of these writers, other than both inspiring famous poets to
come. In Whitman’s defying many of the rules of classic poetry and Du Bois’ novel
defying any easily identifiable genre, one finds an existential notion of reconciling the
uniqueness of the American experience to a universal one. Perhaps it is even as far as
introducing the American experience as the new default for any experience.
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The notion of existentialism amd its conceptions and relationship to the idea of double
consciousness is an idea which I return to throughout this paper. A tributary of classic
existentialism rests with Jean-Paul Sartre’s idea of “radical freedom” which lends itself to
not only the tone of Whitman’s poem in carving an American identity, but also to the
legal foundations of the United States found in documents such as the Declaration of
Independence (1776). Du Bois’ work relates the particular history of slavery in the
United States to the experience of oppressed people of any kind; Du Bois himself
struggled with his own American identity. He also vastly loved and idolized other
cultures, both in Europe and Africa incorporating elements of both in his book. Still,
seeping through the lines of The Souls of Black Folk is the same spirit of a kind of
“radical freedom”—not as a given, but as a goal made with hope. The importance of this
relation in Du Bois’ book contributes to the idea that his work is uniquely American
insofar as freedom is regarded, by Americans, as a very American ideal: not just legal
freedom but also and probably more importantly in the way that Whitman approaches it,
as a feeling or mindset and not contradicting his other political aspirations.

1.3

Double Consciousness as a Particular

The style (in addition to the content) of The Souls of Black Folk lends itself to such an
idea. The book is written in a tone that is both stately and metaphoric and definitely
indicative of the turn of the century excitement. In the second chapter of the book, “Of
the Dawn of Freedom”, Du Bois begins with the idea of the present situation, citing the
main problem of the twentieth century as he states is “the color-line”. He then however
spends most of the chapter recounting the recent history of the Civil War, and the formal
and legal ending of slavery legally, before returning to the topic of present day. In doing

9

so, Du Bois reminds the reader that the present is essentially tied to history. There is no
easy map for the future without addressing the not so long ago history. The chapter
focuses on the great difficulty endured during this time in transitioning the lives of former
slaves into a semblance of some kind of freedom, and the progress made but also the
great failures, painting a picture of the resulting chaos.
Du Bois’ writing is rich with the weight of this history, and throughout the text he
balances those historical implications with his own personal experiences and visions of
the future in order to create the most comprehensive account of the African American
experience available at the time. But while Du Bois does not hide his intentions to gain
more access to education, voting and civil rights, it is clear that while he was in part
forming the beginnings of American racial phenomenology, the unique circumstances
and history can never be removed. As long as there was (or is) still material progress to
be made, that is central to any discussion about the relational aspect of body and mind.
The inter-disciplinary nature of Du Bois’ work is a facet has been noted by Reiland
Rabaka in W. E. B. Du Bois and the Problems of the Twenty-First Century: An Essay on
Africana Critical Theory, as not only a stylistic component but as a way to deal
comprehensively with the extensive and complex structures affecting Black populations
(Rabaka 4). While Rabaka’s work covers a range of ideas, his ability to address and put
into conversation race theorists from various time periods make his work incredibly
fruitful. Additionally, he articulates the goals of critical race theory (African critical race
theory or “Africana”) in a way that both places it within the tradition of “classic” critical
theory and philosophy but also its necessity to be distinguished on its own. I argue that
Rabaka’s usage of Du Bois fundamentally reflects the hopeful and “optimist” element of
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Du Bois’ work, contrasting other schools of thought (that will be discussed in later
chapters) that utilize cynicism to describe the situation of not only Black Americans, but
Blackness as a whole.
Rabaka’s stance on the critical perspective of Du Bois stems from a frustration that much
of this reception tends to overlook the complexity of his work. What he means by this
sentiment is that the multi-faceted and interdisciplinary nature of his work is chronically
taken at face value and not properly comprehended. It is not solely a way to look at
complex issues taking into account many factors, but also a way to give oneself “roots”, a
history and ancestry that had been violently repressed. Part of Rabaka’s analysis seeks to
look at Du Bois in relation to mainstream critical theory. In doing so, he not only
interprets Du Bois’ writing and its significance, but actually reinterprets critical theory
itself to broaden its traditional Eurocentric approach. Rabaka notes that Du Bois’ work
not only utilizes traditionally European perspectives, but also adapts them using
classically African perspectives, and melds the two together. For example, each chapter
of The Souls of Black Folk begins with a poem or fragment by a European writer and a
musical score typically from a spiritual musical score (traditionally African American).
Even if, as some of his critics say, Du Bois is contradictory on his stance at times, he
already creates with these elements a new and unprecedented trajectory for thinking of
America and its racial discord.
Reading Rabaka in relation to Du Bois is helpful not only for the way it breathes new
light into an over one hundred years old text, but also for the way that Rabaka is able to
take a step back in a metaphysical sense and look first at the goals of critical theory, how
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it relates to his own goals, and finally how Du Bois fits in to its history. As Rabaka
writes:
The paradigms and points of departure for critical theorists vary depending on the
theorist’ race, gender, sexual orientation, religious affiliation, nationality,
intellectual interests and political persuasions. For instance, many European
critical theorists turn to Hegel, Marx, Freud, Gramsci, Sartre, and/or the Frankfurt
School…among others, because they understand these thinkers’ thoughts and
texts to speak in special ways to modern and/postmodern life-worlds and livedexperiences…My work, Africana critical theory, utilizes the thought and texts of
Africana intellectual ancestors as critical theoretical paradigms and points of
departure because so much of their thought is not simply problem-posing but
solution-providing where the specific life-struggles of persons of African
descent…are concerned…(Rabaka 62)
Rabaka’s approach demonstrates the way in which critical theory itself, a discipline
which is typically dedicated to being constantly breaking down norms and hegemony is
still very much bound to the same biases it critiques. The rootedness of this tendency in
modernity will be elaborated more upon in Chapter Three. However, the sentiment in
Rabaka’s discussion of lived-experience is a reminder of the often unfeasible ability of an
academic, writer or person in general to conceptualize the experience of another.
Rabaka’s point makes use of this inevitability by embracing his own unique experiences
and other’s and integrating them into his work. The result of avoiding either extreme is in
part to achieve Rabaka’s goal of critical theory: “using all (without regard to race,
gender, class, sexual orientation, and/or religious affiliation) accumulated radical thought
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and revolutionary practices in the interest of liberation and social(ist) transformation”
(Rabaka 66).
This broader goal for critical theory, of which Rabaka’s own writings on Africana studies
is a part, is also useful to create inclusivity, both culturally and academically, when
attempting to engage with critical works. It seems Rabaka, using figures such as Du Bois
wishes not to dismantle the entirety of the “founding Fatherhood” in the same manner as
Collins, but rather build on this knowledge using a more inclusive tone. For example, as I
discuss in Chapter Two, Jean-Paul Sartre can be included in the discussion since his ideas
were adapted by a writer like Frantz Fanon. However, even if a European thinker like
Sartre can be adapted and understood by all different kinds of people, his writing, by the
examples chosen and way he presents ideas, can be isolating to some because of the way
his European and male perspective acts an objective or neutral stance rather than
admitting these things play a role in his perspective. With the exemplary figures he uses
in Being and Nothingness (1956) to describe his idea of “bad faith”—a woman, a gay
man and a waiter—and applying the freedom he might enjoy as a white (collar) man in
French society, Sartre, like Whitman before him, appears not to recognize the structures
that would make the same choices more difficult for the marginalized groups these
figures exemplify.
While Sartre may be of his time and prone to these biases, even in recognizing such,
Rabaka poses the issue which is central as to why more thinkers from outside a
Eurocentric context must be used as “points of departure”. As he claims, there is more to
theorizing than “problem-posing”; understanding these “solution-providing” contexts is
important in order to create structural changes. Additionally, as Rabaka points out, this
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fundamental difference also impacts the ultimate goals of what the theorist is aiming to
achieve. He writes: “Africana critical theory is not thought-for-thought’s sake (as it often
seems is the case with so much contemporary Africana-philosophy notwithstanding); on
the contrary, Africana critical theory is thought for-life-and-liberation’s sake” (Rabaka
67). He continues from this that Africana critical theory is “a new way of thinking and
doing revolution that is based and constantly being built on the radicalisms and
revolutions of the past” (67). The immediate need for action and improvement in certain
communities means that there is a sense of importance about the topics being discussed,
and it comes across stylistically in Rabaka’s writing, reflected also in the writing of Du
Bois. The way that Rabaka clearly states these goals demonstrates a move away from
aristocratic loftiness often found in philosophical texts—i.e. allegorical or overlymetaphoric writing, providing the argument at the end of book or paragraph. He is
integrating the idea of “thought-for-life-and-liberation’s sake” and by doing so, making
his ideas accessible to not only those privileged to have been trained academically in this
history.
While critical race theory as a whole has access to various inter-disciplinary methods, as
articulated by Rabaka, the idea of having neat categories of Eurocentric tradition and then
African studies, gender studies, etc. being branched is a problem within itself and a
reason that it still centralizes the European tradition as a kind of “original”. This idea is
taken up in very different ways which will be explored in Chapter Three. However, the
way in which Rabaka analyzes Du Bois is one that celebrated other cultures and
innovated from them despite the racism he endured. More so, Du Bois was passionate
about the generosity of people of colour even in the face of oppression or adversity. Even
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in his positioning of Black Americans as a “problem” as he does multiple times
throughout his work, it fundamentally implies there is a solution to be had. This is
fundamental difference from the view of subaltern experience, common in postcolonial
studies, that uses language to emphasizes the subaltern’s lack of power. In another one of
Rabaka’s texts: “The Souls of White Folk: W.E.B. Du Bois’s Critique of White
Supremacy and Contributions to Critical White Studies,” he states the following:
Here Du Bois notes major “gifts” or contributions to culture and civilization that
various people of color have made throughout human history, many of them in
their pre-colonial (or, rather pre-European colonial) periods. He does not
diminish or attempt to downplay the “greatness of Europe,” but observes that
“the triumphs of European civilization lie quite outside and beyond Europe.”
From Du Bois’s racial frame of reference, each ethnocultural group or, rather,
each “race” has a “great message...for humanity… He was extremely confident
in the greatness of Africana peoples’ past and present gift(s) and spirit of giving,
even in the face of and often, it seemed, in spite of their endurance and
experience of holocaust, enslavement, colonization, segregation, and so forth.
(Rabaka par. 11).
In this interpretation of Du Bois’ work, Rabaka has already begun to carve out
perceptions of a new tradition separate from the Eurocentric sphere, i.e. the idea of gift as
a means of sharing knowledge as opposed to the capitalization of knowledge or
reservation of knowledge for specific privileged classes. The use of the idea of a “gift”
changes the relationship between colonizer and colonized to restore some power back to
those being oppressed. Ultimately the extreme violence that people of African descent
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faced (and continue to face) did not destroy their metaphysical being but rather
immortalized it.
Du Bois not only applied to his way of thinking (which in many ways defied and
continues to defy the mainstream school of thought) to the roots of Western civilization
on a global scale, but to America. In his 1935 book, Black Reconstruction in America: An
Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to
Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860–1880 he discusses the history of the
Reconstruction Era (1863-1877). This book is more than just an account of this time
period. It can be used as a case study to show not only the complexity of Du Bois’ work,
but the potential. It has become a point of contention as this book in recent times has been
reanalyzed with a Marxist lens as its primary interpretation and the question of if such a
reading takes away from a Pan-African message (Anderson 1). Looking back at the
origins of this book one needs not to look further than the highest earning films of all
time, Gone With the Wind (1939) made only four years after the book was published as to
why an alternative perspective to the Reconstruction Era was necessary. Given that
income inequality between white and black Americans has only continued to increase in
the United States within the last 40 years, it is not surprising why this book is read as a
critique of capitalism (Devounte and Nwafor 161). It was not simple to relay the
underling barriers that newly freed former slaves endured during this time in sociological
terms alone. As Allison Powers explains in “Tragedy Made Flesh Constitutional
Lawlessness in Du Bois’s Black Reconstruction”:
[Du Bois] argues that this fiction is sustained through a paradoxical pairing of two
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separate and contradictory fictions: on the one hand, “that bizarre doctrine of race
that makes most men inferior to the few” (725) and, on the other, the “Great
American Assumption” that “wealth is mainly the result of its owner’s efforts and
that any average worker can by thrift become a capitalist” (183). (Powers 108).
The description of these two “fictions” not only work to describe the major issues of the
era, but also the challenge Du Bois faced in telling the history of this era and its
significance. According to the book The Dunning School: Historians, Race, and the
Meaning of Reconstruction (2013) by John David Smith and Vincent Lowery, a widely
accepted view of Reconstruction existed, via the Dunning School, which was mainly
based on the ideas of one professor and his students (1-3). The historical view that
essentially exaggerated and magnified already existing conceptions about Reconstruction
as a time Southern whites were victimized at the hands of Republicans, removing their
democracy and rights and in general focusing on white suffrage during this time (2-3).
Furthermore, this view was not seen as biased or one of many but actually taken to
greatly influence the teaching of this era, up to the graduate level. The Reconstruction era
was an opportunity for Black Americans to be seen in a new light outside the idea of
slavery, but the Dunning School helped ensure the idea for many that newly developing
voting laws and education were mistakes that ultimately hurt whites. So while critiquing
the economic system that never allowed individuals to ever “catch up” and the racism
that influenced such a system is a main priority for Du Bois, this could not be his final
position on Reconstruction. By focusing on the achievements of the “freedman” as
important and necessary contributions to Reconstruction, despite the political turbulence,
he placed the freedman in a central role, rather than either one of antagonist or victim.
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While the Reconstruction era was seen as a failure by the Dunning School for one reason
and a failure by Marxists/antiracists for another, Du Bois does not concede to its
complete failure, despite recognizing it as a “tragedy”. He does so not to downplay the
horrendous injustices of this era, but rather to carefully change the narrative. The
Dunning School allowed the legacy of slavery ending to fundamentally portray Black
freedom as a threat to order and ideals valued by (especially Southern) Americans. By
showing the contradiction of white supremacy which poses Black people as both a threat
and inferior, he changes the narratives on two accounts. On the one hand he accepts the
white supremacist premises to show how even within their own standards and beliefs,
their portrayal of this era was wrong. Then, on the other hand he seeks to work off other
premises—whether they are Marxist or Pan-African—to critique the entirety of the
American system as a whole. To revert solely to a singular framework is a mistake that
does not encompass the entirety of the weight of this history.
While Rabaka speaks on Africana studies as a whole, the question still remains if there
can be distinguished a unique American perspective out of the larger Africana one. This
is not to imply a nationalistic sense in the work itself, as even Du Bois seems to praise
Europe and some notions of European culture in some of his writing. Rather, when
looking at a phenomenon experienced by people throughout many times and places,
understanding the perspective of the continuity of those who hold these experiences is
immensely important.
While Rabaka’s work attempts to shift ideas in critical theory, the entirety of this work
(or any work in theory) cannot be disassociated from history. As seen in the case study of
the Dunning School, it was not only the policies and movements of Reconstruction that
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affected the future but what was said about what happened during this time. In a more
relevant sense, adapting the ideas of such twentieth century thinkers as Walter Benjamin
and Paul Gilroy, history becomes an important link in overcoming and producing
narratives that allow for understanding oneself and others. Gilroy, who comes from
outside the American tradition, likens the notion of slavery in both in the literal sense of
the institution of slavery and the metaphoric Hegelian sense in his book The Black
Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (1993). Further ideas from this book and
modernity will be discussed in the third chapter of this thesis, but Gilroy’s ability to
string the particularity of events that happened in specific geographical locations (i.e.
slavery in the United States) to broader themes in history that connect all people of a
certain heritage (i.e. all affected by the trans-Atlantic slave trade) makes great strides in
recentralizing the often fragmented discussion of race.
In his discussion of “Masters, Mistresses, and Slaves” in The Black Atlantic Gilroy
asserts: “Focusing on the role of intellectuals within modernity is an important way of
drawing out the particularity that lurks beneath the universalist claims of the
Enlightenment project which was, in theory, valid for humanity as a whole even if
humanity was to be rather restrictively defined” (43). Gilroy’s work dismantles this
particularity by introducing the “black Atlantic” as a singularity—which lends itself
easily to Rabaka’s notion of integrating into contemporary critical discourse various
traditions of thought rather than only European. As he puts it: “Slavery as the premise of
modernity also gives us the chance to reopen discussion of the origins of black politics in
the Euro-American age of revolution” (54). To pose slavery as “the premise of
modernity” indicates a clear shift in thought from a Eurocentric or American-centric idea
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of modernity to a Black diasporic one: “The way these populations continue to make
creative, communicative use of the memory of slavery away from the twin positions that
have overdetermined the debate on modernity so far—an uncritical and complacent
rationalism and a self-conscious and rhetorical anti-humanism” (54). Gilroy’s description
of these two positions overlaps with Rabaka’s idea about the purpose of critical theory
and demonstrates a clear gap in the collective consciousness of the present. The
overwhelming refusal to be critical becomes a symptom of modernity, contradicting the
goal of theory to make changes. Gilroy then goes on to use Benjamin’s theory in order
for the “primal history of modernity” to be “reconstructed from the slave’s point of view”
(54). The result of this shift is not the way slavery is viewed but how history is viewed—
from a specific event to an ongoing belief system that affects societal and personal
relationships today.
The memory of slavery in history, of course, is for the direct descendants of its legacy to
dominate the narrative, and for those outside of it is important to take direction in that
regard. However in recentralizing the topic in this manner Gilroy also demonstrates the
power it holds. Immediately, the idea of the slave trade disrupts the “complacent
rationalism” of Western modernity, and the self-perpetuating idea that it was founded in
this rationalism. If we are to become connected to history, the history that accounts for
racial brutality demonstrates the most major fracture.
Additionally, the relationality between “slaves” and “slaveholders” complicates a very
specific version of the problem of “otherness”. The contradiction of the identity of a
group being dependent on the hatred of another, and therefore the existence of that group
itself, is often pondered in theory; the refocusing through the history of slavery also
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highlights this issue. In the slavery context, “slaveholders” will always reproduce the idea
that while they may be the perpetrators, they are also the liberators. In the United States,
this means that figures such as Abraham Lincoln and the end of the Civil War become
more important in the retelling of this history rather than the focus on the resistance or
lives of Black figures. Rather than slavery as an integral part of America’s fabric,
something that specifically aided its immense economical foundations and the
generations of racism to follow, it becomes part of world history that many nations took
part in, including African nations. While this is true, it leads to the dangerous idea that
the United States specifically ended slavery and holds itself as a beacon of freedom,
which allows some of the very real problems of racism to still exist today, generations
later.
The complexity of Du Bois’ work accounts for these issues in more ways than one. Du
Bois’ approach is always, in many ways, twofold, part of the reason he is so often
misunderstood. This does not mean he is not, in any way, moderate; in fact he is quite the
opposite. While one may argue that his work should be interpreted in a specific school of
thought, and this may be helpful to draw out certain points this can risk losing this useful
tension. The tension is neither cynical or romantic and cannot be solved by
interpretations—it can only truly be solved by liberation, which makes it different than
other points of contention about, for example, human nature. I believe double
consciousness is a way of framing this tension, and already has and is being use by Black
academics, writers and artists to record the presence of slavery and how it shapes our
current culture.
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Before understanding it as such, understanding double consciousness in its original
context is key. This context relates to a topic I have already been attempting to cultivate,
American identity and its significance. As previously mentioned, Du Bois spends a great
deal of time focused on cultivating his social theory around the recent history, social

institution and position of African Americans using the lens of his own personal
experience. He discusses the theory of double consciousness at the beginning of the
The Souls of Black Folk, but does not necessarily dwell on it for the remainder of the
book. He begins by describing how it feels to “[be] a problem” as a “strange experience”,
recalling in his memory of the first time he felt “different” because his race and the
profound moment of realization (Du Bois 8). He then goes on to explain:
…the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with a second
sight in this American world, -- a world which yields him no true selfconsciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other
world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, of always looking at
one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a
world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness, an
American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two
warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being
torn asunder (Du Bois 9).
In this passage alone, Du Bois already gives the reader many hints (in a subtle yet poetic
way) about double-consciousness. He uses the idea of the “seventh son”, which in
folklore is indictive of a family’s seventh son being born with special power(s). The
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“powers” differ dependent on which country the folklore is being told; some countries
leaning more towards the powers being a “curse” and some leaning towards the powers
being a great ability to understand the world (a view which tends to more common in the
United States). Combining the idea of being “gifted” (this idea reoccurring in Du Bois
work) with that of “second sight”, Du Bois already affirms the idea that doubleconsciousness is a positive thing, giving the Black subject a kind of view on the world
that is not available to others. However, it is not clear that this “ability” is totally
available or accessible to anyone experiencing double-consciousness, at any time. As he
defines the idea later in the quote, the language shifts more and more towards expressing
the pure exhaustion, and possible destructiveness that the experience of doubleconsciousness induces on the Black subject.
It is not just that for Du Bois double consciousness can be a gift; it is that Du Bois’ very
idea or critical concept of double consciousness is given to his readers as a gift—one that
after a century, has kept on giving. Double-consciousness can be taken up and understood
in very specific contexts, in the sense of the classic way Du Bois mentions of being Black
(race/culture) and American (citizenship/culture). Questions pertaining to this
understanding highlight the possibility of a uniqueness to double-consciousness as it
pertains to Black Americans as opposed to the experience of Black French individuals or
Indigenous peoples in America. In another way, there are many subtle ways that doubleconsciousness can and has been adapted by Black scholars and Black artists (resulting in
some of the most consumed literature, music and movies on the planet) which indicate
some of the effect of racism towards Black people that is typically not addressed by
institutions when attempting (if it is attempted) to create antiracist policies. Not only is
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one looked on in “contempt and pity” by the larger white society but Blackness itself
becomes posed as morally “dark”. The “twoness” that Du Bois describes emulates not
only the “twoness” of the internal battle one faces but also the nature of duality itself,
often contradictory. Thus the possibility of double-consciousness being a “gift” while at
the same time being a destructive force can be held in the same breath.
Du Bois does not refer to the particularity of being American and Black as to be
exclusive, but rather to first and foremost relate this experience back to the self, and in
many ways himself. While writing in a time only decades after the actual institution of
slavery itself had ended, Du Bois was less removed from the ever-present material
changes that needed to happen in order to gain equality for black Americans. He,
however, faced incredible racism and struggled with finding his way as an “outsider” to
the university. Still, his work does not dismiss the importance of theoretical changes that
society needed to embrace in order to fully reconstruct after the period. Above I had
drawn out some of Du Bois goals in Black Reconstruction in America (1935), but his
retelling of the era is not all he sought to do. He also posed the question: “Just what did
[slavery] mean to the owner and the owned?” (595). This question can be reframed in a
number of ways, such as in terms of the colonised and colonizer, but the notion remains
the same. His posing of these questions of identity, especially in his early work, serves as
a way of uniting all American (or not) Black “folk” who share the experiences he
describes. In addition to this, however, his work is in line with the goals with Rabaka
outlined: addressing where the collective current cultural and personal perspectives stand,
to hopefully not promote racialized (or any oppressed, for that matter) people to become
comfortable with a lower standard of living. This idea, that Du Bois felt was already
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occurring, was iterated earlier in The Souls of Black Folk, in Du Bois’ discussion of
Booker T. Washington:
Mr. Washington represents in Negro thought the old attitude of adjustment and
submission…. Mr. Washington’s programme naturally takes an economic cast,
becoming a gospel of Work and Money to such an extent as apparently almost
completely to overshadow the higher aims of life…Mr. Washington’s programme
practically accepts the alleged inferiority of the Negro races (47).
Much of current scholarship and public thought may not agree with Booker T.
Washington’s spirit of complacency that he embraces, and is criticized for by Du Bois.
Yet this attitude is even more at risk of being spread, in some ways, today than in the era
of Reconstruction or in the era of Du Bois, since modernity and technological advances
as well increased discussion of racialized issues and racism provide a false sense of
progress and change. Rather than returning to the root, rather than asking what slavery,
what racism, what identity truly is, these issues are left to boil under the surface until the
façade of normalcy is blown over and radicalism prevails. Double consciousness allows
one to withstand this ambiguity, which is uncomfortable, until the issue is resolved.
In this supposedly “post-racial” society, the conversation about race is focused mainly on
cultural and social aspects rather than some inherent biological difference. Race becomes
an idealized notion and value system, something that is noted by Sarah Ahmed in her
article “Multiculturalism and the Promise of Happiness” (2007). While herself a

contemporary British scholar, like Gilroy, her work resonates with experiences
connecting all racialized people and one could connect the goal of multiculturalism
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across all Western nations and also the resistance to multiculturalism. In this article,
Ahmed connects the affect of “happiness” to the ideal of “multiculturalism” and the way
in which this actually can lead to opposite of both of these goals. More importantly,
Ahmed questions happiness as a goal. She begins by using happiness as a kind of
standard of the Western world; and in claiming a “crisis” of happiness as a need to return
to certain values. To understand what is behind such a “crisis of happiness” she explains
there “is the belief that happiness should be an effect of following social ideals, almost as
if happiness is the reward for a certain loyalty” (Ahmed 2007). By using examples from
media where a community is happy when its inhabitants are similar to one another, and
“unhappy” when they are different and unable to overcome those differences, Ahmed’s
theory demonstrates the need for everything, complex relationships between groups of
people who have complex histories to be solved with immediacy to fulfill the desire for
instant gratification. She writes:
The demand for happiness is what makes those histories disappear or projects
them onto others, by seeing them as a form of melancholia (you hold onto
something that is already gone) or even as a paranoid fantasy. These histories
have not gone: we would be letting go of that which persists in the present, a
letting go which would keep those histories present (Ahmed 2007).
The importance of history is once again reiterated in this quote, in which Ahmed
criticizes the premise of “happiness” and presents the opposing resistance to “live in the
past”. The idea of slavery as an event of the past fits into this idea, and the act of
forgetting it is a luxury only awarded to non-racialized persons.
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In the scenario described by Ahmed, it is clear that homogeneity is desired to create what
is known as “happiness”. If part of the goal of multiculturism is for these communities to
live in “peace and harmony” it is seems to be predicated on the idea that those who come
from outside whichever the dominating culture is (e.g.. an immigrant to England) are
expected to experience “double consciousness” in a way that does not disturb the
overriding population. They are able to experience elements of their identity which do not
cause conflict and therefore “unhappiness”. However, it seems intrinsic in the very idea
of “double consciousness” that the fractured element, of not feeling fully one identity or
the other, can never fully be “smoothed” out.
Ahmed’s example of the “demand for happiness” is relevant in other ways too—even
ones pertaining to the United States. Du Bois utilizes the ideas of “fictions” in the same
way to show an attempt to create a universal vision for white subjects. These fictions, as
mentioned, are rooted in both capitalist and racist ideals, both not delivering on the
promise of “equality” posed in the Declaration of Independence. The problem is not only
that in citing “All men are created equal” originally clearly excluded certain groups, but
then continuing to expect that after each milestone, whether the ending of slavery, or the
end of Jim Crow laws, that this promise was somehow both finally starting at that
moment and yet consistent all along.
Du Bois’ idea of double consciousness does more than recognize the tensions in such
contradictions in ideology. Whitman’s figure of the (white) body as the soul and the
freedom to conquer oneself become paramount to the American ideals found in the
Declaration of Independence. The tensions between American-ness and Blackness that
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places the two at odds at the level of soul implies that at the root of what it means to be
American is rooted in antiblackness.
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Chapter 2

2

Adapting Double Consciousness as Fragmented by
Colonial Narratives Through Frantz Fanon

2.1 Introduction
To reiterate an idea from Chapter One, The Souls Of Black Folk is not easily definable as
a genre, for Du Bois focuses on telling the narrative of many American figures, locations,
and events always in relation to slavery and the quality of life for Black Americans. By
doing so, the text’s very existence allows this history—the story of Du Bois’ life and
many other Black writers —to formulate a kind of legacy in the same way that so many
works of American white writers—such as Whitman’s Leaves of Grass—has become.
The Souls Of Black Folk responds to the classic American idea of “Manifest Destiny”
with a new idea that justice for black Americans is not just a civil right, but a spiritual
fulfillment. However, because the United States was not the only country that took part in
the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, a global understanding of this history and culture was
important to DuBois. Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) lived in a different geographical context
and time period than Du Bois yet still utilized the idea of “double consciousness” in the
analysis of his lived experience as a man from Martinique living in postwar France in
Black Skins, White Masks (1952). “Double consciousness” became integral to his study of
colonial violence as a whole, not limited to a particular country or group. While Fanon’s
work is written about his unique experience, deeply French in many ways, he utilizes
different disciplines and schools of thought from many cultures to explain his unique
lived experience of being of African and European descent, applying their insights to
broader ideas of blackness as constitutive of a general notion of the human condition.
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I will be building upon Du Bois’ idea of “two-ness” (“two souls, two thoughts, two
unreconciled strivings”), taking the “two-ness” out of its original context of race and
citizenship (Du Bois 9). In some ways, Du Bois’ “two-ness”, of feeling both American
and Black, means that these two souls are based on concepts (i.e. citizenship and race)
which have colonial ties, their meaning reflecting deeply encoded premises that are racist.
Still, Du Bois’ conception of double-consciousness is relevant as a tool with which to
approach the experience of subsequent generations in the African diaspora. However,
since Du Bois’ time the world has only become, in many ways, more fragmented with the
rise of global capitalism, which has had an enormous impact on racialized peoples,
especially Black Americans. More examples of this impact will be discussed further in
the chapter. However, the economic benefits to nations such as the United States from
this globalization of capitalism was of course closely tied to the system of slavery. In this
chapter, using Frantz Fanon’s Black Skins, White Masks to approach broader
geographical contexts and colonialism as a whole, I hope to explore the idea that the
“two”-ness of double-consciousness does not necessarily have to mean a complete
splitting of identity (an inert non-relation of the two souls). I present a fragmented
version of double-consciousness which would pertain to only a certain element or certain
elements of a person’s identity. I derive this version of double-consciousness from
Fanon’s Black Skins, White Masks, and relate it back to the American context through
Richard’s Wright 1940 novel Native Son. These texts reflect on the causes and operations
of this partial double-consciousness living in not only the visible realm but in the
intangible—and how these two are fundamentally related.
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2.2

Fanon and The Violence of Colonial Identities

Frantz Fanon’s work, similar to work the of Du Bois, draws upon different sources from
a variety of historical and philosophical contexts. While situating Du Bois’ work in
relation to the accepted views of his time may help to demonstrate the root of why he
posed things a certain way, Fanon’s attempt to deal with his own unconscious views
means one may use different frames of references. To help better organize a few of the
ideas that are present in Fanon’s work in relation to double consciousness, it helps to see
a few kinds of dualism in the attitudes Fanon subtly describes. Firstly, there is a kind of
split already discussed first discussed by Du Bois, one that differentiates between one’s
nationality and ethnicity. The other dualisms are less tangible and therefore less visible,
but the work of Fanon demonstrates how they are all still as psychologically and socially
isolating. One kind of fragmentation is that of a moral kind: described as “dark and light”
by Fanon, a contradiction of being considered to be morally inferior (i.e. inherently
violent) while simultaneously as being at the receiving end of various kinds of violence.
Tied directly to this kind of moral consciousnesses leads into a focal split for Fanon’s
thought: the age-old dualism of subject versus object, at times referred to in different
contexts as the “master versus slave” dialectic. Another may be by way of polarizing
affect, both in having certain affects projected onto the subject (the “contempt and pity”
brought up by Du Bois) and the experiencing of affects (such as the ones in Native Son
discussed later on).
To begin bridging these various dualisms and their ultimate effect on double
consciousness, the conversation of nationality is inevitable. Fanon, having and writing
about preconceived ideas of Europe and America, already contributes to the analogy of
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utilizing Black movements through these spaces as all part of the same system. While
much of this chapter focuses on one of Fanon’s early works, Black Skins, White Masks
which was written in 1952, a later work of his, The Wretched of the Earth (written in
1961) is also one of his most widely read texts. The preface to this later work was written
by Fanon’s friend and mentor, Jean-Paul Sartre, whose notion of objectivity I will
critique below. Sartre’s preface jousts with particular white readers who assume Fanon’s
goal as seeking revenge for the injustice of racism (9). Sartre retorts, “Fanon has nothing
in for you at all; he speaks often of you, never to you” (10). The “you” that is referred to
signals a larger idea that Fanon builds throughout the book and finally in the conclusion.
He writes that his idea of Europe is one that “undertook leadership of the World with
ardour, cynicism, and violence” (311). Instead of seeing the United States as an
opposition to European oppression and values, he argues the following. He poses the
United States as a “former European colony” that decided to “catch up with Europe” and
that it inevitably “succeeded so well that the United States of America became a monster
in which the taints, the sickness and the inhumanity or Europe have grown to appalling
dimensions” (313). For Fanon, the “newness” of the American identity consists of the
negative traits of Europe chronically magnified. If this is true, then Fanon’s conception of
Europe and America can be used to deepen the connections of the trans-Atlantic slave
trade. However, if Fanon’s work addresses the effects of racialized violence on the
consciousness of the one that experiences it, then it is not enough to see just his
conception of the United States but include his conception of European anti-Black
violence as well. In the chapter “The Black Man and Psychopathology” from Black Skins,
White Masks, Fanon writes:
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In the United States the Black man fights and is fought against. There are laws
that gradually disappear from the constitution. There are other laws that prohibit
certain forms of discrimination. And we are told that none of this is given
free…For the Black Frenchman, the situation is unbearable. Unsure whether the
white man considered him as consciousness in itself-for-itself, he is constantly
preoccupied with detecting resistance, opposition and contestation. (154)
His comments here are not only in reference to political differences between the United
States and France, as Fanon’s book arrives at the dawn of the civil rights movement in
the United States, as well as at a time when France was still holding many colonies at the
precursor to the Algerian War of Independence in 1954. Besides the political and social
difference between the two nations in this quote, they also become symbolic
representations between subject-object relations. It is the way he seems to be describing
various kinds of splits in a person’s psyche—usually an embodied as a racialized
person—that manifests as forms of double consciousness, that perhaps do not completely
overpower one’s identity, but alters at least some part of it under certain circumstances.
For a moment I will ponder Fanon’s idea of what it means to be unsure of being
considered as “consciousness in itself-for-itself” pertaining to the burden of the French
Black man. I will borrow terminology from a classic philosopher who plays an important
role in Black existentialist schools of thought (for reasons discussed in this chapter and
Chapter 3), Søren Kierkegaard. He writes the following in The Sickness Unto Death
(1849):
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The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self, or it is that in the relation
[which accounts for it] that the relation relates itself to its own self…Man is a
synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom
and necessity, in short he is a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two
factors. So regarded, man is not yet a self. (qtd. Peredoom & Guignon 78)
Kierkegaard’s conception of man and his fundamental constitution as stated here is a
paradox; and is in many ways humorously and purposefully convoluted. In the history of
philosophy, the “spirit” is often considered the “free” part of the soul, which tradition
Kierkegaard recognizes when he proclaims man is born to be “free”. On the other hand, a
person is bound to a large extent by their particulars: where they are born, what gender
they are, their class positionality, religion and so forth. Somewhere between the struggle
between the “finite” and “infinite” elements of a person is that person’s true self. Feeding
too much into one side or the other can cause a person to be in a state of “despair”
(anxiety) which is the “sickness” itself. Borrowing this framework, I will look at various
examples Fanon provides in which there appears to be a kind of disruption to a person’s
“relation to the self”.
The first example of a thing which disrupts a person’s self-relation is language, which is
the focus of the first chapter of Black Skins, White Masks. Fanon begins the book on the
topic of language which sets the tone for how important language is; not only in the
establishment of a person’s identity but also for its capacity to be weaponized as a tool
for racial violence. He writes:
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All colonized people—in other words people in whom an inferiority complex has
taken root, whose local cultural originality has been committed to the grave—
position themselves in relation to the civilizing language. (2)
He goes on then to describe the frustrating phenomena of the constant scrutiny he faces,
as a person originating French colony to the mainland, regarding how he speaks and what
he says. For Fanon, it becomes apparent that colonized people (whether Black,
Indigenous or otherwise people of colour) are never truly accepted, no matter how much
or little they integrate – and they face this from not only people from the “civilizing” land
but also from their place of origin, as they no longer fit there either. This experience, of
course, is not specific to those from previously colonized nations but applicable for the
experience of immigration in general. Language is thus used in this way as a measure to
determine a person’s intelligence or status, further categorizing an individual into a
certain social standing. If a displaced person loses some of their native tongue while
learning a new language and is isolated from both then it can be stated that this conflict of
languages is another form of double-consciousness.
Fanon alludes to an example of how many young men from Martinique sought to gain
expertise on French literature or philosophy, in the “hope their blackness will be
forgotten” (170). The creation of a French colony (Martinique) instilled the idea of racial
superiority and cultural superiority, as an extension, which asserts the notion that
“becoming more French” is the only way to rise within the social hierarchy. Yet these
observations came only after Fanon had moved away from Martinique, upon joining the
French Free forces in the war, to live in France. This relocation made the experience of
the oppression of occupation in Martinique at the beginning of the war to the anti-black
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racism in France pivotal in shaping his views. But before this moment, as suggested in
the way Fanon describes life in Martinique and in tandem with Isaac Julien’s 1996
documentary, Frantz Fanon: Black Skin, White Mask, people in Martinique largely did
not relate to other people of African or Arab descent [36:00-36:32]. Fanon was one of the
first people to articulate on these relations exposing the internalization of colonial
attitude, turning his back in some ways on the country he had once fought for (France) to
seek liberation for all nations that had been colonized [36:32-37:02].
Fanon dedicates a chapter of Black Skin, White Masks to the matter of “The Black Man
and Language”, arguing about the entanglement of language and colonialism, and once
again invoking the tension between subject and object relations, disguised as tensions
between subjectivities. The Martinique subject views themselves in terms of their Frenchness and ability to adapt French culture, whereas when in France these markers of status
are erased by skin colour. Upon relocating in France, Fanon finds himself constantly
subject to slurs that demean him, but instead (or in addition to) fearing for his life in the
face of these verbal assaults, Fanon articulates the constant fear of wondering if others
see him as “consciousness in itself-for-itself” like themselves.
But the issue is not about convincing subjects that one kind of literature or language is
superior, rather in positing that the idea of French-ness becoming a moral issue rather
than a culture one. What makes the use of this moral coding so powerful is not only the
split it causes in Fanon, but also the feelings of guilt, shame, and fear that are invoked in
him. Fanon writes in Chapter Six, “The Black Man and Psychopathology”:
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Moral consciousness implies a kind of split, a fracture of consciousness between a
dark and light side. Moral standards require the black, the dark and the black man
to be eliminated from this consciousness. A black man, therefore, is constantly
struggling against his own image. (170)
Fanon uses strict dichotomy between “light” and “dark” to demonstrate how strict
categories of what is acceptable determine how the Black man becomes overdetermined
as a “symbol of sin”, which is nothing more than a scapegoat for white guilt (170-174).
The way that this moral consciousness came to place the Black man as an image of the
“dark side” in European imagery, and the various forms of this scapegoating takes shape
(especially in light of modernity) is discussed further in Chapter 3. For now, I would like
to focus on how this conception of weaponizing morality replaces the self-relation
constitutive of the self in existentialist philosophy with a “non-relation” as outlined in
Fanon’s critique. He scrutinizes how the transformation of the Black man into the
“symbol of sin” in European consciousness causes a fetishistic fixation on that Black
body—as that which is forbidden, and the different implications of this, i.e. sexual. On
page 174, he continues to describe how for the Black man himself, he begins to see
himself as belonging to this “dark” side as well, resulting in a kind of double
consciousness—either wanting to be seen or not seen as “Black”. If one accepts their
blackness as inherently evil, they seek to confirm it (174). More than this, in recognizing
the absurdity of these two options, which are not truly options at all, the awareness of this
type of double consciousness holds a great power. He seems to suggest that in rejecting
these two paths deemed acceptable, one has no choice but to gain a certain deeper level
of understanding of the “universal” (174). Alluding to the idea of the master and slave
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dialectic rooted in Hegel’s idealism, Fanon refers to the potential of this power, which has

the ability to “shake the foundations of the world” (175). However, this comes at the
radical cost of the “self-destruction” of the Black man, who seems to fall in a “black
hole” (175). What is meant by Fanon in this idea becomes apparent in works of literature
such as Richard Wright’s Native Son, which I will discuss later in the chapter and again
in Chapter Three. The trope is played out all too often in non-fiction, highlighted in
recent incidents of police brutality towards black victims, and the BIPOC people who
have sparked movements and protests against it. To put the conversations of racial
injustices back on the table only comes at the cost of a life. Using such a form of double
consciousness as a phenomenological model shows that how an individual views
themselves is more than an issue of identity, more than the perceived feeling of being an
“outsider”. In Du Bois’ conception of double consciousness, the conflict comes when one
“ever feels his twoness” of being both American and Black (Du Bois 9). This definition
sets the stage for the possibility of synthesis with Fanon’s ideas about blackness and
moral consciousness. If so much of what it means to be “American” is encoded in
premises of antiblackness then one is always in opposition to him or herself. Du Bois
asserts the point that it is not about feeling American in certain instances or feeling Black
in others, but rather to engage with the experiences of feeling both tensions as a fact of
lived reality.
Returning to the idea of colonial relations as a whole, Fanon draws on his experiences
growing up in Martinique alongside those of his later experiences in Algeria during the
French occupation. Similar to Du Bois’ prioritization of the period after slavery, as in his
critical analysis of Reconstruction, Fanon focuses on the period after independence. As a
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psychiatrist, Fanon was able to work not only with victims of torture in Algeria during
the war, but the French soldiers responsible for committing acts of violence towards local
Algerians. Prior to this time, his birthplace, Martinique gained independence from France
in 1946—the midpoint of his life and during the time of his work. His treatment of the
psyches damaged variously by colonial violence was predicated upon the physicality of
power struggle during the war, which created seemingly irreversible, lasting damage on
the dispositions of those in the front lines. Here, one can begin to draw other links
between other forms of colonialism and slavery besides physical violence that can be
further used to understand Fanon’s work. As Cameroonian scholar Achille Mbembe
writes in his 2019 book Necropolitics, regarding the effects of colonialism, “colonial
wars were wars of extraction and predation”. For Mbembe, the process of colonialism
entails “entire peoples labor[ing] under the apprehension that the resources for continuing
to assume their identities are spent” (2-4). Mbembe refers to the system of colonial rule
and struggle for power as largely dependent on exploiting the land and human population
already inhabiting it for resources of a certain kind. More than this, however, the
exploitation of people for commodities is made possible by a re-alignment of identity.
The group being exploited becomes complicit in the degradation of their land thus
forcing the exploitation to become a part of their identity. Mbembe’s conception of
colonial violence alludes to not only the physical force of violence but methods that also
change one’s conception of self.
The psychological and physical violence Fanon saw and scrutinized in the Algerian war
took place during the same time that residential schools were open and operating in their
peak in Canada, across the Atlantic ocean—over four hundred years since Europeans first
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set foot in Indigenous territory. Over half a century later, Indigenous scholars have
articulated the way in which this history still is pervasive in contemporary Canadian
identity. In Settler: Identity and Colonialism in 21st Century Canada (2015), Emma
Lowman and Adam J. Barker, seeks to disassociate the notion that nations like Canada or
Australia became decolonized when they separated from England (25). Settler
colonialism explicates the phenomenon of claiming power for local governing bodies at
the expense of denying the sovereignty of Indigenous populations. Lowman and Barker
say the following about settler colonialism:
We can say that when they move to new places, settlers carry their sovereignty
with them and then after selecting a place to live, justify asserting sovereignty—
their power of governance over that territory—through narratives of progress and
superiority. (25)
The colonizer creates a “new” identity for themselves, based on the sovereignty they
assert in their assumed dominant relation to the Indigenous population. The idea of
superiority, which will be discussed shortly, whether speaking to a notion of superiority
of race, religion, culture, or language, is not born purely from ignorance or hatred but is
also a necessity—a premise of power that guarantees survival and a legacy of
sovereignty. It should be also noted in this argument, that the idea of sovereignty in
colonialism gets removed from any inherent “claim” or history with the land. The notion
of sovereignty, as well as the premise that land can be claimed and exploited for
instrumental use, is settler baggage wholly divorced from the ancestral ties and cultural
traditions associated with the land before their arrival.
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Lowman and Barker argue that in its final form settler colonialism “transcends” itself—in
other words, it becomes a pervasive and integral presupposition on which its society is
built, “naturalized, normalized, unquestioned and unchallenged” (26). This is maintained
by conveying history in a way that emphasizes or downplays certain events to look
favourable to the colonizer (26). The same kind of transcendence is attempted with
Slavery as well; as elaborated upon in the widespread teaching of the Dunning school’s
view on the period of Reconstruction mentioned in Chapter One. One could argue that in
North America, this transcendence has exceeded itself; prime ministers make public
apologies for infractions against Indigenous populations, many schools, universities and
even churches utilize public land acknowledgment of tradition Indigenous lands and so
forth. These are all passive ways of relieving settler guilt, all the while refusing to
question the very roles these institutions have played in the subjugation of Indigenous
populations (or take the questioning further, translating it into the action of dismantling
and replacing those institutions). That does not mean that these practices are illintentioned; however they do aid the further continuation of the settler colonial legacy by
being restricted to mere speech; that of a performance of reparation suited to satisfy
settler but not Indigenous needs. The idea of settler colonialism is especially dangerous
inasmuch as covert ways of racism prevail in the controlling of language. The social and
economic devastation a nation like Algeria faced after gaining independence from France
is not necessarily more or less destructive than settler colonialism as described by
Lowman and Barker. However, the persistent attitudes necessary to perpetuate settler
colonialism, which are allowed to fully develop and ripen into transcendent forms, the
colonizer’s psyche.
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In the American context, the idea of settler colonialism (and manifestations of
colonialism) is complicated by the system of slavery in a way many other countries do
not endure. Black slaves were forced to take part in the extraction and cultivation process
of the land, all the while facing the same structure of dehumanization as Indigenous
populations under liberal notions of “superiority and progress” that Lowman and Barker
mention. The paradox of being an integral part of the new sovereignty of the land, yet
that sovereignty and power belonging to someone else with no room to overlap, may be
considered to be a major factor in explaining the “two soul-ness” element of doubleconsciousness, as opposed to the less fully split experience. While there was a war for
“independence” in America, it was not between the local inhabitants and colonizers that
framed the settlers as victims of oppression from the mainland. This allows for a split
consciousness to occur where the oppressed and oppressors are both white and of
European descent, and the oppression of Black and Indigenous populations in North
America deliberately remains undetected. Now that the paradigm of defining oppression
has been shifted, the “oppression” of white North Americans—while still holding
sovereignty of the land in many, is focused on by a great margin, and has given rise to the
new fascism of white identity politics. This plays into the identity of settlers as they
formed the ideals of a “new” nation instead of returning to the mainland. Instead of
recognizing the trauma of the colonized nation, the memory must constantly evolve as
Lowman and Barker state to transcend and continue sovereignty—implying it is still
present. It is possible that this literal presence pertains also to the legacy of slavery—
which is important to arguments such as those by Afro-pessimists which I will be
discussing in Chapter Three.
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What Lowman and Barker call “narrative” pertains to the notion that a certain individual
or collective is allowed to hold ideas that do not contradict their fundamental beliefs
while benefitting from actions that contradict what they espouse. Already Fanon
demonstrates the power of moral consciousness on one (“the Black man”) who has been
made out to be a “symbol of sin”. Now, I turn to look more specifically at some of the
factors that create this “narrative”. Explicit attempts to see the historical and cultural
images of a certain group as inferior is not the only means of justifying oppression. As a
doctor of psychiatry, Fanon often uses examples of his peers both in the past and present
using to ruminate on this premise. As he writes in just one example: “In all seriousness
they have been rinsing out their test tubes adjusting their scales and have begun research
on how the wretched black man could whiten himself” (Fanon 91). The mid-century
scientists Fanon were referring to were not trying to prove blackness was a “bodily curse”
but they had already accepted it and were working off this premise (91). As noted by
Raymond Williams in his 1983 edition of Keywords: A Culture and Society, the entry for
the word “racial” contains the idea of races presupposed by the categories of as used
originally in “classificatory biology” (Williams 249). It operated by differentiating
groups within a certain species, and specifically the human species, in order to denote
characteristics of certain groups defined as racial markers (Williams 249). Although
there today there may be ethical codes against the kinds of experiments Fanon mentions,
and the word “race” or “racial” has evolved in common usage, so as to perpetuate racist
premises in a detrimental way. In his 2012 book Black and Blue: The Origins of and
Consequences of Medical Racism, John Hoberman uses historical medical records to
illuminate the racist perceptions of black patients in the United States from the early 20th
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century onwards. An example of one of these perceptions is the widespread belief among
doctors that that Black patient’s illnesses were largely “self-inflicted” (Hoberman 21). He
states that many of the negative connotations surrounding Black patients are actively held
by doctors today, whether subconsciously or not. While he argues that this is part of a
great inequality in service available between the quality of healthcare for Black
Americans being much lower than that of white Americans, this is not the of crux his
argument. He continues, that though these journals changed the racist tone of their
writing, by acknowledging the discrepancies in medical care, most point to “sociological”
factors as the cause, without much enthusiasm for solving the problem (23). Furthermore,
the lack of healthcare is a compounded effect of poverty and a mistrust of the medical
system, which are important factors in considering these issues. Hoberman’s work goes
further than stating what contemporary medical journals seem to be content with by
describing the phenomenological reality of the medical community regards to healthcare
inequality. He observes a kind of splitting of consciousness employed to keep the
accepted paradigm of medicine—to borrow the words of Lowman and Barker—
"naturalized, normalized, unquestioned and unchallenged.”
The way that this status quo is maintained by the medical community, as described by
Hoberman, is a microcosmic indication of how other kinds of bodies continue to operate
under certain narratives. He points out a disconnect between, as mentioned, the medical
community’s attempt at acknowledgement and understanding of some of the issues that
cause medical inequality. As Hoberman writes:
The medical literature’s response to overwhelming evidence of racially biased
(and potentially deadly) behaviors has thus combined two strategies. On the one
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hand, there are the hundreds of peer-reviewed reports of racially differential
diagnosis and treatment. At the same time, the presentation of these data employs
a rhetoric of alibis, euphemism, and denial. The purpose of these rhetorical
strategies is to demonstrate that, regardless of what the statistical evidence says
about their behavior, American physicians are not “racists” who require
reformation or public exposure. (41)
Hoberman uses this contrast of “strategies”, not in order to critique individuals doctors
themselves, but rather to disclose the great lengths that medical institutions go to in order
to, as he says, create “alibis”. One method of argument is to locate sociological factors as
the sole reason for their outcomes, and another is to emphasize the “busyness” of doctors
that force them to rely on impersonal stereotyping for their diagnoses (41-42). However.
Hoberman makes the claim that the medical community willfully chooses to deny taking
into account the medical history of racism so that it may concede to a kind of medical
“agnosticism” (44). What Hoberman means by this term, is a refusal to take an
unambiguous stance on the cause of certain medical discrepancies caused by racial bias.
There have been acknowledgments of bias and a need to better understand the
relationships between patients and doctors, but as Hoberman notes, this has mostly lead
to a cyclical argument of “we need to understand more about what we don’t understand”
(42). The kind of denial described by Hoberman is not limited to medicine and the points
Hoberman makes about medicine, but certainly applicable to other branches of scientific
and humanistic thought such as history, philosophy, anthropology, psychology and so
forth. Hoberman’s thesis in this chapter is that all of these tactics for “denial” are in
actuality about not wanting to take responsibility for the unresolved issues of the past.
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His research discloses a fundamental inability on the part of the medical institution to
face its colonial roots and colonial language. Furthermore, a capitalist society prioritizes
the quantity of working time over the consideration that this pushes workers into a state
of anxiety and apathy about their work. This creates a culture of efficiency (as opposed to
effectiveness) associated with doctors facing time constraints and therefore the inability
to address their own biases. This is not entirely the fault of the members of the medical
community, but Hoberman argues that these time constraints are relished as hallmarks of
medicine and part of the larger cultural understanding of what it means to be a doctor. As
shown by Hoberman in this book, the condoned negligence used to decide which issues
are worth the medical community’s time and efforts and are not without consequence
(which potentially mirrors the same habits of other institutions) directly resulting in the
physical and mental harm of Black patients.

2.3

Discourse on the Projection of Morality as Racism

Now that the effects of having unchallenged attitudes in the institutional setting of
contemporary medicine have been elaborated upon, it beckons us to consider the
motivation behind these attitudes and why they came to be so necessary to maintaining
the paradigm of Western science. One common thread in the underlying narrative in both
colonialism itself and the specificities of the trans-Atlantic slave trade and African
diaspora is Fanon’s idea of inferiority and superiority. The idea of superiority is referred
to by Lowman and Barker also mentioned as a key idea in recycling the settler colonial
narrative. In Jean-Paul Sartre’s 1946 book The Anti-Semite and the Jew, the topic of
hatred in the form of racism is looked at more broadly rather than in the particular scope
of colonialism. Sartre’s insights, which were important to Fanon, shed light on the
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inferiority and superiority complex integral to these relations of racial animosity. He
writes: “The anti-Semite has chosen hate because hate is a faith…He tries simply to
project his intuitive certainty onto the plane of discourse” (20). It is interesting that Sartre
uses Kierkegaard’s term, faith, to describe the experience of hatred. He mostly uses the
term in the context of his ideology of “good” and “bad” faith, yet this application still
constitutes the idea of putting one’s belief in something unfounded (intuition). He then
goes on to describe the anti-Semite as having a certain kind of freedom or “right to play”
(20). He claims that the racist or anti-Semite does not even necessarily fully believe in
their hatred. Or, to some extent, Sartre claims that a part of the anti-Semite or racist
person finds their hatred at least somewhat ridiculous, and when confronted may not even
defend their point of view (20). Someone who can freely assert anti-Semitic claims
reflects their privilege to amuse themselves with “eccentric” views. The colonizer,
however, relies too heavily upon the resources of the colonized—whether it be their land,
labour power, or commodities—to have the luxury of throwing discourse around for pure
entertainment. The dissonance between the anti-Semite’s views and Jewish identity does
not necessarily need to assert itself in such an obtuse manner for the “bad faith” of the
position to be seen. Medical researchers see a racial bias, have access to the racist history
of medicine to see results repeated throughout history patients which entail Black patients
receiving worse treatment or dying more frequently from certain causes, yet they are
institutionally compelled to claim ignorance about the cause. As Hoberman suggested,
this refusal take a leap in concluding that responsibility on behalf of the medical
community should be taken perpetuate a kind of “bad faith”.
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Sartre may describe the person who is already well into believing they are superior and
we have seen some of the ongoing historic and cultural messages that contribute to such
beliefs. Yet still, his account of this complex only takes them as attitudes or feelings at
face value, describing a scenario of the anti-Semite as a person of privilege, but also a
person subject to their emotional whims. Additionally, anti-Semitism in this context that
Sartre would have witnessed occurs internally in the country. Antiblack racism occurs in
this context but also between nations. Fanon comments more on this relationship in
Chapter 5 of Black Skins, White Masks, “The Lived Experience of the Black Man”,
suggesting that antiblack racism cannot be reduced to a kind “faith” to which person
chooses to engage in. “The plane of discourse” to which the anti-Semite chooses to
project onto implies a kind of neutral zone to which all kinds of perspectives exist. What
Fanon implies is that the plane itself has shifted to a place where due to incredible
violence, the language of articulating blackness and antiblackness is hardly in the same
realm of discourse. He discusses some of the horrors discovered as he read about
colonialism in African nations (and uses Sartre’s analysis of the anti-Semite at times to
do so). In reaction to Sartre he writes: " A feeling of inferiority? No a feeling of not
existing. Sin is black as virtue is white. All those white men, fingering their guns, can’t
be wrong” (118). In this quote, Fanon moves beyond the idea of being superior or
inferior—which may be the easiest way to conceptualize racial issues. But in fact, this
affiliation extends to the black subject not as feeling like an inferior subject at all, but an
object. Once again the double consciousness to two forms of subjecthood now becomes a
distinction divorced from the concept of subjectivity itself.
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The colonizers (or those who benefit from such values) not only seek to maintain
supremacy over the oppressed group, but rather, are compelled to create a new narrative
erasing much of the oppressed group’s existence. Determining cultural practices as
barbaric, or rewriting scientific definitions of races to assert them as less human creates a
new set of “facts”—and as we have seen previously, of morality. Fanon, as a psychiatrist,
intentionally uses the analogy of “Sin” over any other negative adjective because of the
commanding relationship many readers (mainly being Christian) have to the idea of
Sin—a festering and deep-seated fear.
Thus, as Fanon implies here the colonizing group “can’t be wrong”, not only because
they have the use of violence, but they claim to have the force of God on their side. The
use of religion implies a kind of “bad faith” wherein white subjects may not even truly
believe that their religion justifies racism. But in doing so they project their guilt and
disavow their own “darkness” onto Black bodies. As Fanon reminds us: “A normal black
child, having grown up with a normal family, will become abnormal at the slightest
contact with the white world” (122). This “abnormality” occurs in being subjected to
these contradictory notions that were created specifically to push aside the inherent
contradictions of being. In other words, when the default of whiteness is always used, no
matter the country or time, blackness always becomes an anomaly. While Fanon uses his
own experience to demonstrate his “otherness”, often in very blatant ways, it is the ways
that seem to transcend being obvious which appear to hurt the most.
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2.4
Double Consciousness Through Affect in Richard
Wright’s Native Son
In Black Skins, White Masks Fanon makes reference to a character named Bigger
Thomas, a fictional character from Richard Wright’s 1940 novel Native Son. This novel,
which sets its narrative in 1930s Chicago, would have been a new release just prior to the
time Fanon wrote. Fanon is clearly moved by Native Son and the character of Bigger; he
references him in such a personal way, as if he is a familiar person. As much as Bigger is
a fictional character, he is also used by Fanon as a figure of fate. His tragic story bridges
his character to a specific and particular to a time and place, but also in such a way that
he becomes an immortalized archetypal. In the opening scene of the novel, Wright
skillfully uses naturalism to achieve the goals of realism—a precedent that is kept
throughout the novel. The opening scene of the book delves directly into the
impoverished life and conditions of the Thomas family. Their living situation is a product
of redlining (the systemic prevention of giving African Americans access to certain area
of housing in cities)1, but Wright does not explain this right away. Instead, he gives a
vivid description of the daily lives of the Thomas family. A summary of the scene is best
described by Kadeshia L. Matthews in “Violence and the Flight form Blackness in
Richard Wright’s Native Son”:
The opening scene of Native Son immediately impresses us with the cramped,
improper domesticity of the Thomas family. Even were Bigger inclined to use this

See: Wiley-Blackwell. “The United States: One Century of Redlining.” Place, Exclusion, and Mortgage
Markets, 2011, pp. 77–102
1
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space as in antebellum literature, it is not one likely to be productive of any stable
or complete identity. Mother, sons, and daughter all sleep, dress, cook, and eat in
the same tiny room. The intrusion of the rat points to the apartment’s disrepair, as
well as its unsanitary, dangerous condition. The narrowness of the Thomas’s
room reflects the narrowness of their lives. Wright portrays the Thomas women as
defeated, wanting nothing more from life than what whites are willing to offer.
Mrs. Thomas, with her constant talk of death, seems old before her time. Her
religion pacifies rather than inspires her; it teaches her to endure injustice rather
than challenge it and to wait for a better world after death. Bigger perceives his
sister, Vera, as a younger, less religious version of their mother, and whereas he
has dreamed of flying planes, her highest ambition seems to be work as a
seamstress. Even Buddy, who is feminized in relation to Bigger, strikes his older
brother as “soft and vague . . . aimless, lost . . . like a chubby puppy” (108). The
vagueness Bigger identifies in his family suggests their lack of will or purpose, of
identity even.
Through Matthew’s summary, it is easy to picture the implications of the Thomas’s
family situation, how their financial situation bleakly reflects their mental states. Readers
of Native Son are not brought to a period of the past, but are brought immediately to a
present that transcendence culture or year. The reader gains a glimmer of hope when
Bigger is offered a job from a wealthy white man including living in his home; it is at
least a promise of a better material condition than his current one. The reader quickly
realizes something that Bigger seems to know and accept all along; the “opportunities” he
receives will never materialize into anything but space for condemnation, an extreme that
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is realized in the eventual accusation leveled against him of the rape and murder of his
bosses’ daughter, and of finally being sentenced to death at the end of the final chapter,
which is bluntly called “Fate.”
As much as Bigger is a fictional character, he is meant to represent any Black person
living in a white supremacist society, a person whose first crime (or perhaps “original
sin”) was simply being Black. Though the story is much about Bigger, the reader actually
feels distant to him—partially because Wright explicitly documents Bigger’s stunted
character development as a result of his predicament. The result is a splitting and trapping
of his consciousness between two states, the first being a perpetual state of ennui at the
mundanity of a life where one is not able to pursue to much of anything and the second
being a perpetual state of dread contemplating the inevitable violence to come. Bigger
expresses his ennui in the novel when he and his friend, Gus, see Air Force pilots flying
planes above, feeling a desire do the same, but reiterating how it will never be a
possibility for them. Regarding this realization: “For a moment Bigger contemplated all
the “ifs” that Gus had mentioned. Then both boys broke hard into laughter, looking at
each through squinted eyes” (22-23). The boys laugh not because their desires are funny,
but rather they laugh because to even entertain such a thought of an impoverished Black
person in America working as a pilot seems ridiculous. The only way to deal with the
harshness of the reality is to have a sense of humour. In the same conversation, Bigger
mentions in the same conversation he feels like “nothing ever happens” yet at the same
time he also reveals (in one of the few times we do get a look at Bigger’s thoughts and
feelings) his strong feeling that something “awful” is going to happen to him (23-25). He
is vague in stating this, but such ambiguity is precisely his reality, if the string of events
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did not unfold the way they did in the book they could have unfolded in any number of
ways with the same outcome as Bigger’s demise.
The contrasting feelings of impending doom and perpetual boredom is reminiscent to the
distinction that Walter Benjamin makes between two types of experience: Erfahrung (or
long experience) and Erlebnis (or isolated/shock experience). Efrahrung is rooted in
tradition, and something that connects the collective with the individual and enriches the
individual while he or she is never removed from history2. Erlebnis is an isolated
experience, taking place in a certain specific time and place in history but not connecting
to anything else outside of itself. In the modern world, says Benjamin, one continuously
experiences a set of occurring “shocks”, each one further distancing themselves from
each other. This is also the experience for racialized figures such as Fanon and Bigger
Thomas. Fanon makes reference to several traumatizing personal anecdotes of being
called racial slurs, such as the example he gives in the beginning of Chapter Five of Black
Skins, White Masks being called the n-word, or encountering racist stereotypes such as
the figure of Y a bon Banania mentioned throughout the text (Fanon 89). These events
cause a constant state of traumatizing shock—disconnecting the individual from
themselves and others, as they are kept in a state of high tensions and fear: an overdose of
Erlebnis. In many ways these kinds of experience noted by Benjamin come out of taking
up the work of poets, such as the 19th century French Charles Baudelaire to describe the
newly industrialized world of life in cities, the vulgar shock experiences with growing
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capitalism during this time period. Yet in order to adapt the distinction between Erlebnis
and Erfahrung as it pertains to the experience of Bigger Thomas, one must take into
account the essential part of slavery that involved disconnecting Black slaves from their
homeland, children from families so it is difficult if not impossible to have a sense of
heritage or ancestry.
As Fanon notes, at the same time as being denied access to this history and cultural
practices, access to a notion of identity is only given through a dominant white narrative
which is the only allowable expression of this culture. For example, Fanon describes the
feeling of feeling “responsible” not only for himself but for his “race” and his
“ancestors”, along with “cannibalism, backwardness, fetishism, racial stigmas, slave
traders, and above all, yes above all, the grinning Y a bon Banania” (92). Essentially any
of the negative narratives used to oppress his ancestors replaces any of the positive
narratives one can usually form about their history, family, or culture. Although he is
seeing himself as both “himself” alongside this racist lens, but is difficult to combat these
negatives images without an ability to connect with one’s past for those forcibly removed
from their heritage.
The ultimate result of these two contrasting sensations is most likely despair, yet Fanon
alludes to fear. About Native Son, he writes:
It’s Bigger Thomas who is afraid but afraid of what? Of himself. We
don’t yet know who is, but he knows that fear will haunt the world
the world once the world finds out. (Fanon 118)
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Not only does Fanon acknowledge that we never fully learn about who Bigger is (and he
does not necessarily find out himself), but he is fully aware of the consequences his race
has for him though Bigger himself does not carry this power. This is also reflected by
Mbembe when he speaks of a person of colour’s constant need to justify their existence:
“As a result, he fears showing himself such as he really is, preferring disguise and
dissimulation to authenticity and convinced shame has been brought upon his existence.”
(Mbembe 132). The ambiguity in the text makes it unknown whether the accusations
against Bigger is true or not, but either way Bigger himself accepts that he is the
murderer by the end.
When the reader finally does come across Fanon’s reference to Native Son without
reading the book they are likely to be confused for he writes with very little context: “In
the end, Bigger Thomas acts. He acts to put an end to the tensions, he answers the
world’s expectations” (Fanon 118). But in this short sentence alone, Fanon already
bridges two ideas important for understanding Bigger’s fate (I believe, in a ironic way).
Firstly, in reference Bigger Thomas acting in the end, he purposefully does not say
exactly in what his action is, but in keeping with the ambiguity of the novel—he asserts
that it does not matter. The murder could have been an accident or not, but Bigger was
already “violent” before he was even given the choice. Fanon uses the idea of action here
as a reference to his existentialist counterparts such as Sartre (and others like
Kierkegaard) in which action is the primal expression of one’s fundamental freedom.
However, throughout the novel Bigger’s ability to act is greatly restricted from lack of
personal stimulation to a systemic lack of opportunities. In such a way (Fanon critiques
existentialism’s propensity to exclude embodied and stigmatized people. The way that
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Bigger “acts” by accepting himself to be the murderer, and confirming his selfperception that he, as a Black man, is inherently violent, and that his fate is the only
acceptable way Bigger could relate to white society.
The end of the novel is still dissatisfying, as the reader is forced to want Bigger not to
accept his fate and to side with the lawyer, who tries to help him get off. Max urges
Bigger to not give into what the world tells him he is, and tries to get him to admit the
structures in place created by those with the power to determine his predicament (Wright
388-391). One gets the sense that Bigger is more aware of this than he leads on, but
perhaps that route is too painful for him to pursue. Though Jewish himself, and the
recipient of his fair share of racism, Max seems much more in tune with Bigger’s plight
than the other characters, usually white, who seem to “sympathize” with black characters
and try to “help” Bigger, all the while failing to their actions that add to the problem.
While potentially well-intentioned whites try to take part in the “decolonization”
process——whether it be public apologies, land acknowledgements, or even academics
such as myself writing on this topic, Mbembe makes one thing clear:
Violence pre-existed the advent of decolonization, which consisted in setting in
motion an animated body able to completely and unreservedly deal that which,
being anterior and external to it, prevented it from arriving at its concept.
(Mbembe 6)
Bigger “becoming” violent is not the problem, as “violence” itself is inherent to the
situation of colonialism and racism. The reader’s desire for Bigger to see himself in a
non-violent way, whether coming from a well-intentioned place or not, is still part of the
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larger problem—it is to demand or assert control over the way a person sees themselves
while simultaneously benefitting from the same society that was built upon the premise
of their invisibility. While pondering the freedom to which a character like Bigger has,
one notes how other characters, such as Bigger’s girlfriend, Bessie, are discarded of,
unseen by the world and given no voice at all. While Max attempts to advocate for
Bigger, a Black woman such as Bessie is allotted no form of justice at all, demonstrating
the scale to which this oppression exists. While Bigger may have an appearance of choice
in the novel, other characters do not have an appearance at all.
In the next chapter, I look at the history of modernity as building these premises,
allowing the violence towards Black folk to be brought into the present. Then, I look at
the movement of Afro-pessimism which takes up this inherent presence of violence,
positioning Black folks inherently with this kind of fate.
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Chapter 3

3

Double Consciousness in the Legacy of Modernity

In this final chapter, by once again taking a historic and theoretic approach, I discuss
some factors in tracing the roots of ideas about Black consciousness. Positioning thinkers
such as W.E.B. Du Bois in history and asking the question of what the significance of his
or her legacy is, is more than a sociological query. One asks these questions recognizing
that there is a fundamental issue with resolving problems with the current methodology
that helped to create them. Paul Gilroy’s book The Black Atlantic (1993), introduced in
Chapter One, both directly and indirectly takes up Du Bois work in the context of
“modernity” and why concepts of this time period still haunt the current discourse on race
theory. The first chapter of this paper considered double consciousness as a product of
Du Bois’ legacy, a “gift” that ultimately holds the potential of hope. Yet in Chapter Two,
focusing on Fanon and Wright’s predications of double consciousness, the idea was
raised that there exists a difficulty in adapting existing vernacular to “double
consciousness”, considering the great violence and projection of white guilt onto Black
bodies. In this chapter, following this chronological movement, I compare concepts from
the first two chapters as interpreted by Gilroy and the contemporary “Afro-Pessimist”
movements. Finally I return to the figures of Du Bois and Richard Wright and the way
their lives embodied their intellectual work. By doing so, I hope to demonstrate some of
the implications these interpretations could have on double consciousness in the
formation of a new metaphysics.
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3.1 Modernity, Post Modernity and Paul Gilroy
In Chapter One, I already discussed Gilroy’s idea of modernity, but here I look at why he
chooses to relate this topic to the idea of “double consciousness”. As a historian, Gilroy’s
work considers the “Black Atlantic” not only as a series of events, but also by using
specific figures, and symbols to represent a wider network between certain communities
and cultures. However, the creation of the idea of the Black Atlantic is not so much an
organic tool to tell these stories and experiences. Rather, his work comes from a place of
necessity to confront the violence of slavery which had been carefully separated from the
period known as “modernity” and the particular ideas of this era. Furthermore, in the
aftermath of the African diaspora, Gilroy uses the Black Atlantic to overcome the
polarization of different African-derived cultures in achieving the common goal of
liberation. For Gilroy, the entirety of the trans-Atlantic slave trade falls into the same
period known as the “modern” period. This era consists of a wide window of many
centuries, a period which has often been designated by white scholars as the
“Enlightenment,” and studied mainly in isolation from the history of slavery. Gilroy
attempts “to develop the suggestion that cultural historians could take the Atlantic as one
single, complex unit of analysis in their discussions of the modern world and use it to
produce an explicit transnational and intercultural perspective” (Gilroy 15). To consider
the meaning of this view one must consider what exactly links together the events that
make up what is known as “the modern period” (made up of the early modern, which for
Gilroy takes place roughly from 1500-1800, and the late modern, which he dates from
1750-1914). The major events associated with this period, like the American and French
revolutions, in addition to periods of scientific and industrial change in both Europe (and
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what was becoming) North America, are linked by the fact that they were part of one
world, the European “West.” The “other world” (i.e. Africa and areas of African
diaspora) was both non-existent and the object of obsession. This paradox that manifests
itself in many ways becomes the central focus of this chapter.
Following Du Bois, Gilroy's retelling of this history and movement through time and
space is not linear. One comes to understand how his approach to history is in many ways
exclusively antiracist and anticolonial due to his prioritizing and organizing of
comparisons of figures from different times or places. The result is that his work does not
serve to fit itself in as a supplement to already existing historical narratives. Rather his
work relates certain moments to one another to paint a picture of Black consciousness
rooted in social, artistic and academic traditions. Gilroy’s project, like Du Bois’s, then
becomes an affront to current methodologies of understanding history. It is not an attempt
to look at the Black Atlantic as a ‘reaction’ to the racism of the past and present, with the
racism being still the primary event in mainstream perspective. Rather, the events and
people Gilroy discuss (even if in fact in opposition to the oppression) fundamentally are
the primary event of that period.
Consider even the status quo. An example can be made even how students in Canada are
taught about Canadian history. In the Ontario high school curriculum (updated 2015), the
government attempts to include more Indigenous history, and more history about
immigration. In the same breath, the curriculum focuses on students find the “big idea”—
a vague overarching argument—from the topic studied (18). In their own words, even
long after the “details” and much of the content about the lesson is forgotten by the
student, they will remember the essence of the “big idea” (18). These ideas are usually
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broad enough not to offend any particular group, but narrow enough so that it lacks any
real meaning. Without considering the weight of these “details” students are forced into a
singularity that does not recognize the potential differences in how perspectives were
recorded, i.e. historically recording a larger proportion of white settler perspectives.
These problems are not necessarily limited to history, or any discipline, just like the
issues of inequality in healthcare addressed in Chapter Two were not limited to medicine.
Gilroy’s work exposes how academic disciplines such as English and (by extension)
critical theory are relics of “modernity” out of step with many undeniable realities. These
disciplines, especially as more and more English departments move towards rebranding
themselves as “Cultural Studies”, remain very much rooted in the English tradition that
poses postcolonial studies or race studies as a subgroup (Gilroy 4). In the very language
of this discussion, Gilroy notes how the word “culture” itself is essentially being used
interchangeably the way that “race” was used— in a historically racist scientific
definition (5) Gilroy embraces these critiques, which creates a space to confront the
subtleties of slavery, in part to address the disconnect between Black academia and
mainstream culture, especially in his home in England. He notes that in England,
polarization based on class or gender limits the effectiveness of a theoretical approach to
antiracism (320). The problem of inclusivity and representation in academia seems
closely related to this issue that Gilroy brings up; the lack of representation in certain
discourse is a symptom of these larger disconnects based on markers like class. With this
in mind, Gilroy does not only attempt to use his idea of the Black Atlantic in opposition
to modernity or to contrast it. In some ways the concept is an attempt to formulate an
adequate response to this period. As Gilroy writes,
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Though largely ignored by recent debates over modernity and its discontents,
these ideas about nationality, ethnicity, authenticity and cultural integrity are
characteristically modern phenomena that have profound implications for cultural
criticism and cultural history. They crystallized with the revolutionary
transformations of the West at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the
nineteenth centuries and involved novel typologies and modes of identification.
Any shift towards a postmodern condition, should not, however, mean that the
conspicuous power of these modern subjectivities and the movements they
articulated has been left behind. Their power has, if anything, grown, and their
ubiquity as a means to make political sense of the world is currently unparalleled
by the languages of class and socialism by which they once appeared to have been
surpassed (2).
Gilroy here demonstrates an innate understanding of the importance of linking questions
(in varying degrees of abstraction) about nationality, ethnicity and culture not only as
notions in-themselves, but how they have been put into conversation over the past
century.
Implicitly, Gilroy points to the subtleties of language in formulated ideas about the
differences between “races” and how these ideas represent a mode of violence that was
carried on past the time period itself. Closely related to the discussion of historic
scientific racism in Chapter Two of this thesis, Gilroy notes the foundation of concepts
such as “nationality” as part of this racist or colonial legacy i. This foundational racism is
reflected in how ideas of “culture” were weaponized against groups who considered
“barbaric” or “backwards” in comparison to European culture. However, it is also
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reflected in in the ways that these ideas of “ethnicity” or “culture” then became closely
related to another in a problematic way. To Gilroy, exclusively associating ethnicity and
culture (already rooted with these colonial problems) “links the blacks of the West to one
of their adoptive, parental cultures: the intellectual heritage of the West since the
Enlightenment” (Gilroy 2). In Gilroy’s research, he noticed that no matter the political
stance, an adherence to “cultural nationalism” when theorizing about “histories and
experiences of “black” and “white” people” was commonly present. The problem of
identifying oneself with the “parent” culture, i.e. the oppressor’s culture, and with their
ethnic identity as defined by that specific culture once again creates disruptions in the
narrative of racial discourse. Du Bois and Gilroy’s method of utilizing elements of this
“intellectual heritage”, both in a (European and American sense) unilaterally with other
elements (both in a traditionally African and diasporic sense) results in their work
overcoming the limits of this cultural nationalism.
Gilroy then, in reference to a “postmodern condition” mentions a “shift”—the thought of
which seems stills present today in both academia and more mainstream cultural outlets.
The mention of a “postmodern condition” by Gilroy is likely alluding to Jean-François
Lyotard’s 1979 book The Postmodern Condition (42). Lyotard’s idea of what
“postmodern” means comes in contrast to his idea of what “modern” is. In his definition,
the “modern” reflects the replacement of gaining knowledge of certain topics such as
“meaning” and “spirit” with science (including philosophy during this time) (Lyotard
xxiii). Similarly to Gilroy’s view, for Lyotard “modernity” is closely tied to the
“Enlightenment period”, as mentioned, a time where intellectuals saw themselves as
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working toward the perfection of humanity through rationalism. 3 Lyotard argues that the
presence of these kinds of goals (described as narratives) is what separates the modern
from the postmodern (xxiv). Referencing Marx’s theory of automation, 4 wherein the
development of machinery separates a worker from the physical process of their work,
the development of computers and technology have an effect on the transition of
knowledge (4). Lyotard, in his book, goes further into the relationship of knowledge to
capitalism and effects of this change, such as the commodification of knowledge (4). One
of the primary defining factors of postmodernism that Lyotard notes is a fundamental
shift in language use (15). To elaborate, Lyotard poses that scientific pursuits are now not
only searching for the answers to different questions than before, but rather the entirety of
the conversation has changed so that the conversations do not coincide at all (15-17). The
disconnect of this “postmodern” condition is made possible due to the fluidity of
language, the ability for the same words to take on different meanings in different
contexts. The nature of language to do so is then exploited by the unrelinquished
logicism, which began during the time of the Enlightenment and the new methods of
transferring and communicating (computers) (17). What knowledge and information has
(and is) becoming for Lyotard is similar to Benjamin’s idea of shock experience
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introduced in Chapter Two of this paper. As Lyotard writes: “The old principle that the
acquisition of knowledge is indissociable from the training (Bildung) of minds, or even of
individuals, is becoming obsolete and will become ever more so” (4). The instant
production of knowledge that one has immediate access to, through phones or computers,
can be compared in the same way that an individual can experience a series of “shocks”
that removes them from a sense of history and process.
Returning to Gilroy’s thoughts on these ideas of postmodernism from Lyotard (as well as
others such as Frederic Jameson and Jürgen Habermas), if his conception of modernity is
rooted in relation to the trans-Atlantic slave trade, then so is his conception of
postmodernism (42). Yet, Gilroy warns that the reality of postmodernism is not as
removed from the past as Lyotard suggests. Lyotard already points to the notion of the
commodification of knowledge, such as to serve the interest of the state (as in the
previously mentioned example of the Ontario school system’s history curriculum).
However, the callousness of Lyotard’s suggestion that there are no longer overarching
“narratives” cannot be fully considered when, as discussed earlier, much of the
recognition of slavery was never made part of the “modern” era (Gilroy 42). To Gilroy,
the trepidation over abstract entities (such as knowledge) becoming commodified when
Black bodies had already been commodified shows an improper understanding of
modernity on the part Western intellectuals (44). As discussed in the case of settler
colonialism, Lowman and Barker are that the continuation of settler colonial narratives
will always be necessary in order for settler colonial societies to exist. Gilroy’s
participation in the conversation of the “crisis of modernity” and interest in how Black
scholars deal with this issue, while also calling the entire debate “extensive and unusual”
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and “tied both to the fate of intellectual caste” seems, in some ways, contradictory (43).
He notes how the entire discussion is better used to witness a kind of cognitive
dissonance on the part of intellectuals (in modernity) and the role of intellectuals as a
whole (43). Yet he continues in the discussion of modernity, rewritten with historical
anecdotes and biographies of important Black figures and artists who contribute
understanding to this time. For example, he suggests looking to figures such as Frederick
Douglass’ narratives as an alternative or as supplementary material to Hegel’s masterslave-dialectic, providing details of Douglass’ life and thoughts on master-slave relations
(60).
Gilroy is able to use these contrasting ideas about modernity because he wants to
emphasize the kind of double consciousness emerging from this intellectual and cultural
work, existing “inside and outside the conventions” (73). Gilroy’s idea of double
consciousness recognizes Du Bois’ original reconciling with race and “American-ness”,
but ultimately feels that his theory was meant to encompass more than that. He writes,
about Du Bois in The Souls of Black Folk:
Double consciousness emerges from the unhappy symbiosis between
three modes of thinking, being, and seeing. The first is racially particularistic,
the second nationalist in that in derives from the nation state in which
the ex-slaves but not yet citizens find themselves rather than from their
aspiration towards a nation state of their own. The third is diasporic or
hemispheric, sometimes global and occasionally universalist.
This trio was woven into some unlikely but exquisite patterns in
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Du Bois’s thinking (127).
As alluded to in Chapter One, Du Bois’ work did not just define “double consciousness”
but embodied it. Gilroy identifies the typical notion of double consciousness: race and
nationality. In mentioning a third kind—the “diasporic or hemispheric” he goes beyond
including and emphasizing Du Bois’ Pan-African vision. One critique Gilroy (among
others) had made towards thinkers from the Enlightenment was that under the guise of
universalist claims, such as notions of “egalitarianism” and “freedom”, was truly a kind
of particularity that only applied to a few intellectuals and privileged individuals of the
time (59-60). Du Bois’ double consciousness is presented in the opposite way as an
inversion of this order, beginning with the particular, even personal, and moving outward.
Gilroy’s approach is not limited solely to this idea, but he embraces the “trio” of Du
Bois’ double consciousness into his discussion on modernity. Describing double
consciousness here as “unhappy symbiosis” captures the discomfort of balancing these
modes of “thinking, being, seeing”, also implying that an element of double
consciousness exists wherein these modes are not in sync. Even with these unfavourable
elements, Gilroy’s use of double consciousness as a tool against the singularity of
modernity ultimately positions him in a “hopeful” light.

3.2

Despair and Resignation: Afro-Pessimism

In the next section, I look at the use of “despair” and resignation as tool in the creation of
Black metaphysics. To do so I will approach the contemporary movement of Afropessimism, situating this movement into Du Bois’ legacy. The purpose of this section is
to compare Gilroy’s approach of returning to modernity while dismantling notions of
cultural nationalism to an approach (from Afro-pessimism) that constitutes a shift of
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language to achieve some of the same goals. Both approaches build from foundations
rooted in ideas from Du Bois and Fanon, among others. Afro-pessimism describes itself
by some of its main contributors and founders, Patrice Douglass, Selamawit D. Terrefe,
and Frank B. Wilderson as:
a lens of interpretations that accounts for civil society’s dependence on
antiblack violence—a regime of violence that positions black people
as internal enemies of civil society, and cannot be analogized with the
regimes of violence that disciplines the Marxist subaltern, the postcolonial
subaltern, the colored but nonblack Western immigrant, the nonblack queer,
or the nonblack woman. (par. 1)
While both Gilroy’s work and Afro-pessimist writings address the continual violence of
slavery that continues to exist in the present, Afro-Pessimists already begin with this
premise and look at the present. There exists a sense of urgency in the tone of these
writers, understandably, so that if the reader takes away nothing else from this passage,
they take away that there is a violence, and it is happening now. Moreover, it is rare, in
critical theory, to see figures from various complex works (the proletariat, the woman, the
queer, the postcolonial subaltern) listed side by side callously, when typically each title is
usually debated and heavily analyzed. Yet here, the writers group them together as to
denote the differences between them. In resisting the “ruse of analogy” and
distinguishing antiblack racism from these other forms of oppression, the authors in some
ways mirror Fanon’s notion (discussed in Chapter Two) that the Black subject actually is
not a subject at all in the eyes of the World, but an object. Western cultural humanism
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hinges on the presence of a shared “humanness” behind each person, regardless of their
distinct experience of oppression (whether based on gender, sexual orientation, class, or
race). Afro-pessimism dismisses this idea, not merely from a materialist or “experiential”
perspective but rather from the “ontological” idea that Black people cannot be lumped
into this definition of “human”. The reasons for the difference, according to the founders
of Afro-pessimism, are that firstly the kind of violence inflicted is different. Secondly,
they do believe that Black people possess “the inability to share in the same kind of
trajectory of liberation as other populations” (par. 1). They argue that the positioning of
all Black populations, regardless of country or culture is unique to the positioning of any
other othered or embodied person that is addressed by critical theorists.
Gilroy’s work, while recognizing the violence that is so central to the Afro-pessimist
analysis, still uses the idea of “successive displacements, migrations and journey’s forced
and otherwise which have come to constitute those black cultures” as a point of
connection between these communities versus the idea of violence alone (112). Using the
present as a point of departure, Afro-pessimists have reconstituted (or claimed to have) an
idea of “Being” that has arguable remained static through many periods of thought.

3.3

Conceptualizing Afro-Pessimists and Violence

Keeping in mind both of these critiques on modernity, this next section will conceptualize
the idea of doubleness using the concept of “the anxiety of antagonism” created by the
founders of Afro-pessimism.
As a contemporary movement, Afro-pessimism has even been discussed in mainstream
publications such as The New Yorker, including the idea that Black populations live in a
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perpetual state of “social death” (“The Argument of Afro-pessimism” by Vinson
Cunningham (2020)). Afropessimists do not dwell on the individual differences between
Black communities based on nationality. Afropessimist thinkers argues that such
considerations are “inessential to a paradigmatic analysis” (par. 2). Gilroy would seem to
agree with notion of not needing to conflate culture and nationality. Yet in rejecting these
sociological categories, one notes Gilroy’s slower approach in painting an entire picture,
moving from geographical locations to different moments in time. The Afropessimists
write in a very different way, as stated in the Oxford Bibliographies entry on AfroPessimism, written by some of the founders and main contributors of the movement:
What is essential is neither the interpersonal nor institutional orientation toward
blackness, but the fact that blackness is the essence of that which orients. Put
differently, the coherence of reality (be it institutional or interpersonal coherence)
is secured by anxiety over both the idea and the presence of blacks. The black, to
paraphrase Frantz Fanon (Fanon 1967, cited under Afro-Pessimism and
Psychoanalysis), is a stimulus to anxiety, and it is the anxiety of antagonism
(Sexton 2016) represented and embodied by blackness that creates the condition
of possibility for both the rigid one-drop rule and the catholic plethora of shades
that are named in countries like Cuba and Brazil. (par. 2)
The ancient philosophical problem of what is essential is one which in many ways had
been abandoned in the age of modernity by European philosophers. But for Afropessimist philosophers, the present lived reality of Black people demands that the
problem of essence be taken up again. Gilroy’s work focused on the erasure of the
African diaspora and trans-Atlantic slave trade from the conception of modernity in
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history. In putting forward of the idea of Blackness being “a stimulus to anxiety,
and…the anxiety of antagonism” to once again demonstrate that at the same time as
being erased, Black bodies became an object to project this anxiety of whites. In Chapter
Two, Fanon’s notion of Blackness being a “symbol of sin” from Black Skins, White
Masks resonates with this kind of projection.
The concept of anxiety used by Fanon originates from his conceptions of psychoanalysis.
Fanon’s body of work describes in great detail the kinds of subconscious effects that
racism and colonization have on the psyche of an individual, some of which were
discussed in Chapter Two. While Fanon’s work derived from his own practice and
observations, Afro-pessimists in this context do not situate this idea with any particular
time or place. This implies that even in the present, the status of being “a stimulus to
anxiety” has not changed. In Black Skin, White Masks this restricting force is contrasted
with the radical freedom of existentialism, as inspired by one of Fanon’s mentors, JeanPaul Sartre. This pattern is found too in Wilderson’s definition placing the discussion of
essence beside the idea of anxiety. As Wilderson and Douglass argue in “The Violence of
Presence: metaphysics in a blackened world,” the juxtaposition of the philosophical and
psychoanalytic problems of essence and anxiety is intentional:
We contend that black philosophy should continue to pursue this kind of
juxtaposition: an irreverent clash between ensembles of questions dedicated to the
status of the subject as a relational being and ensembles of questions dedicated to
what are more often thought of as general and fundamental problems, such as
those connected with reality, existence, reason, and mind; in the form,
specifically, of a clash between questions concerning the always already
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deracination of blackness and questions, for example, of metaphysics—rather
than pursue a line of inquiry that assumes a stable and coherent philosophical
vantage point from which a black metaphysics can be imagined. This is because,
as we argue below, for blacks no such vantage point exists. Such a project could
stand the assumptive logic of philosophy on its metaphysical and ethical head;
just as a similarly blackened project has turned the assumptive logic of critical
theory (specifically, its starting point, which assumes subjectivity) on its relational
head. (117)
As discussed earlier in the context of modernity, Gilroy was let down by thinkers who
conceptualized ideas about modernity and post modernity. Yet these thinkers had the
privilege a of connection to their heritage to build on—a luxury not awarded to all. Even
if certain philosophical movements became affected by historical events, such as wars or
industrialization and was thus reflected in mainstream academic thought, slavery was not.
The idea of a “vantage point”—especially having no vantage point, contrasts with Du
Bois’ idea of a “second sight”. As alluded to in Chapter One, Du Bois’ double
consciousness could potentially provide one with a more insightful ability to see the
world. But if one is not given the vantage point to put it to use (i.e. opportunities,
education) it could become a “dreadful objectivity”— Richard Wright’s definition of
double consciousness, which implies a bleak fate (Gilroy 30).
In some ways Gilroy uses the example of various figures to create “vantage points”. In
Chapter Four of The Black Atlantic, Gilroy’s focus on Du Bois’ life itself rather than
solely his work could be considered a representation of the project Wilderson and
Douglass pursue. In Chapter One, I already presented the question of Du Bois’ legacy,

72

and his life in terms of his outsider status at the university. Gilroy recounts Du Bois’
extensive travels without settling in one place for too long. His travels began after the
first World War to Europe and spanned his lifetime until his death in Ghana at age 95—
where he had in fact renounced his American citizenship altogether (117). Du Bois’
movements across continents, and movements politically, serves not only as a historical
reference, but demonstrates in many ways his personal testimony of struggling with
identity throughout his life. Despite his changing stances on various issues throughout his
work or moving to various countries, his life enriched his work through this twofold
nature. Though he could have had a profitable career in the United States, his rejection of
the status quo and the “American Dream”, in part contributed majorly to American
culture.
When one reads Du Bois’ definition of double consciousness, there is a sense of
familiarity one feels, even if they do not themselves relate to that particular experience.
On a macro level, the imagery of modernity is that of a whole, a singularity, and the
image of post modernity is fragmentation; this is often projected on the idea of the self.
One sees the idea in psychoanalysis the idea of conflicting parts of one’s
unconsciousness, and in Benjamin’s idea of shock experience discussed in Chapter Two,
for example. This point is made by Wilderson in the article “Grammar & Ghosts: The
Performative Limits of African Freedom”. The article discusses the way in which
gatherings of people with roots from the African diaspora, a conference in his specific
case, often result in “a palpable structure of feeling, a shared sense that violence and
captivity are the grammar and ghosts of our every gesture” (Wilderson 119). He
specifically mentions the delicate issue of some Black artists preferring to be known
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“simply as artists, not as African or black artists” (122). As a critical theorist, Wilderson
is familiar with how theorists such as Marx and Freud and Lacan, all deal with the
“”partitioned”” nature of our existence” (ibid). To Wilderson, though these ideas suggest
that all artists, regardless or race gender, cannot be free of such “taints” (ibid). The
subjects theorized by the examples used by Wilderson are faced with the “mystifications
of the ruling class (Marx), the ego (Freud), or the Imaginary (Lacan)” but not with the
unique violence of “enslavement” that African-derived people do (ibid). Thus, as an for
Wilderson, it is incredibly important that the idea of the self in this case cannot be
conflated with identity or experience but rather ontologically. Gilroy begins this process
by rooting the existential erasure of Blackness in modernity, and advocating for the
centralization of Slavery to be at the basis conception of modernity. Double
consciousness is both a way to know the self that is both ontological and based in
experience. In one way, Du Bois describes double consciousness as a way of a “feeling”
and how one relates to the self. In another, double consciousness situates this mode of
being in the particular history of the African diaspora and Slavery, as part of a particular
process. Therefore, in looking more in depth at Wilderson’s ideas in Afro-pessimism
stemming from the violence inflicted toward African-derived groups in modernity,
double consciousness could be used to bridge the dissonance between the ontological
and existential language to rewrite these narratives.
Wilderson and Douglass also allude to the ability of the new metaphysics to turn some of
the premises of both philosophy and critical theory on its “head”. In the case of critical
theory as stated: “specifically, its starting point, which assumes subjectivity”. They are
alluding not to the use of subjectivity itself but rather the use of subjectivities as
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interpretation: all subjectivities being equally true but simply different lenses of
perspective. In the entry on Afro-pessimism (2018), the authors mention their
indebtedness to black feminist writers: not only, to their credit, for their privileging of
“position (or paradigm) over performance”, but also for recognizing the clear difference
between the plight of white feminists and feminists of colour. The cross-section between
racism and sexism, or class may now be considered to be “covered” under ideas such as
intersectionality; however such terms may not be an influential enough conception to
prevent the issues of white female subjects being prioritized. Thus, Afro-pessimists have
created a shift in language, removing the equation of subjectivity altogether.
Fanon articulates this kind of subject/object split in various ways, and in this articulation
there is an always present and reoccurring idea of violence. For Afro-pessimists, the
paradigmatic nature of anti-Black violence is part of the “jump” separating Blackness
from other subjectivities who have experienced oppression or violence. The idea of
violence is elaborated on further in “The Violence of Presence: metaphysics in a
blackened world” by Douglass and Wilderson. In this article, they claim the work that of
Elaine Scarry, an American academic, in her 1985 book The Body in Pain: The Making
and Unmaking of the World “advanced” the idea of the subject in critical theory. In
Wilderson and Douglass’ conception of Scarry’s theory, the victim of “torture” or the
person who pain has been inflicted on is at risk of losing their “metaphysical presence”,
destroying if not their essence, then their ability to come to know themselves (118).
However, Douglass and Wilderson contrast Scarry’s idea with the work of contemporary
poet and scholar John Murillo:
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John Murillo describes the psychic life of black people as no life at all. (14) In
other words, for Murillo, neither torture nor the havoc wreaked by war qualifies
as an event that affects the metaphysical plentitude of black life because blackness
is constituted by an injunction against metaphysics, against, that is, black people's
attempts to clarify the fundamental notions by which people understand the world,
for example, existence, objects and their properties, space and time, cause and
effect, and above all possibility. (118)
The idea presented by Murillo confirms the Afro-Pessimist usage of the term “a priori” to
position Blackness—as a “slave” (118). Despite the literal physical violence that targets
Black populations in addition to other kinds of systemic violence, Murillo “argues that
the fragmenting process the black psyche undergoes is beyond "the event horizon,"
unlike Scarry's subject whose event horizon is the episode(s) of torture. For Murillo, the
event horizon is not a narrative moment, or a moment that can be narrated, but being
itself” (121). Note that in the analogy of the event horizon, rather than there existing an
“event” of violence, the violence becomes the point of no return to lose oneself—but this
is still a definitive point. Returning to the idea of violence, Scarry claims her victim loses
the ability to “know herself as a relational being”, due to the pain and torture inflicted,
which Wilderson and Douglass agree with. However, even this statement alone is
partially contradictory. Depending on the reasons for torture (i.e. the victim’s beliefs or
convictions)—it may actually strengthen their relationality to the reason. In this case—
the necessary element to their being, the body, is being destroyed on account of
something that is a “relation to the self” and for this reason their humanness or “being” is
still intact. In the case of the necessary element of one’s being destroyed on the basis of
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another necessary element to their being, this is different. It is especially different when
the one who is being targeted is not privy to a certain time or reason. When the violence
continues for hundreds of years, there is no “event horizon”, it simply manifests in
different ways. Thus Douglass and Wilderson do not identify with the torture victim from
Scarry’s account. The respective forms of violence cannot be made to relate analogically.
In the rejection of subjectivity and identification with Scarry’s victim one is left with the
idea of, in some ways, resignation to a kind of despair. Afro-pessimism may be a
contemporary movement but even long before Fanon, “pessimism” played an important
role in the history of Black consciousness. Discussed earlier in this chapter, Gilroy
compared the narrative of Frederick Douglass to Hegel’s master-slave dialectic.
According to Gilroy, in Hegel’s allegory, the slave “prefers his master’s version of reality
to death” (63). To Douglass, however, the (actual) slave would prefer death rather than
continuing the “inhumanity on which plantation slavery depends” (63). The idea of this
death reflects the idea of the “social death”, Murillo’s description of “having no life at
all” and Fanon’s “feeling of not existing”: all of which allude to a kind of resignation. As
discussed in chapter Two of this paper, in Black Skins, White Masks Fanon speaks of
(what I had called a kind of double consciousness) the power, yet possibility of selfdestruction in acknowledgement of society’s views, especially associating Blackness with
a kind of “darkness” (Fanon 174). There is sense of a similar kind of notion in Afropessimism: on the one hand the destructiveness of a “social death”. On the other hand,
Afro-pessimists do believe that in accepting the premises of such as lens, there exists the
power to create a new metaphysics and philosophical traditions.
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3.4

Noted Critiques of Afro-Pessimism

There are many fair critiques of the controversial Afro-pessimist movement, and as a
contemporary movement, discourse is constantly evolving. In “Afro-Blue: The Death of
Afro-Pessimism” by Greg Thomas, using ideas from Gloria Emeagwali, he critiques the
movement and main contributors on some of the following points:
a. Ignoring or misreading many historical events
b. Misreading of certain texts and authors
c. Selectively reading certain texts (i.e. Only Black Skins, White Masks of Fanon’s
work), and also reading many white scholars over Black scholars who have
contributed to the topic in the past, yet remarketing the movement as wholly
“new”
d.

Being highly American-centric (resulting in “throwing” away Pan-Africanism
and discussions of Africa altogether)

e.

Playing into a view of Africa or Africans that already is incredibly bleak and
negative

f. The use of “pessimism” in a nihilist way—not in a productive sense, but rather in
a hopeless way
g. Generically referring to complex ideas (i.e. feminism and Marxism) and in a sense
“throwing them out” when many important Black theorists and activists have used
and continue to use these ideas in antiracist contexts
and finally,
h. Differentiation of violence and suffering of Black people compared to that of
other colonized subalterns, in many ways even differentiating Black-
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colonialization in Africa or South America from the specific system of slavery in
the United States
While all of these critiques could be applied to my own paper, I agree with many of
Thomas’ evaluations. The “trendiness” of Afro-pessimism is suspicious in the sense that,
given the racist roots of Western academia, a movement that uses the language of Afropessimism, (especially referring to Black people as “slaves” and not “human”) could play
in to white fetishism of violence against Black bodies, although meant to make a point
about the current systemic racism towards Black folks. Taking on such a language with
proper care could be a challenge for many universities who already struggle to prioritize
race and Africana studies as well as having diverse faculty. The ways in which students

are taught about race—even if done so in a “progressive manner” reinforces a
narrative of the status quo—even if not that is not the professor’s or institution’s
intention. This was one point made earlier addressed by Gilroy, as he noted the roots of
ideas about nationality and race as problematic. To elaborate, consider one of the most
the widely read novels in academic institutions, Heart of Darkness (1899) by Joseph
Conrad. The students (and professors) may read and discuss how the characters construct
Africa as the “blank space on the map” or, as Chinua Achebe writes in his criticism, as “a
metaphysical battlefield devoid of all recognizable humanity” (Achebe 6). Achebe has a
difficult task in critiquing the beloved book, especially when proponents of Conrad’s
work argue that the book demonstrates the inhumanity of Europeans (in their cruelty in
the book) more than that of Africans. Yet, as Achebe argues, Conrad did not invent the
view of Africa or Africans as portrayed in the book, he simply used his talent to exploit
the already unchallenged image of the continent: “reducing Africa to the role of props for
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the break-up of one petty European mind” (Achebe 6). Critiques like Achebe’s are then
taken out of the fictional context and taught to dismantle the colonial attitudes in the
book. Yet subliminally, “the blank space on the map” idea still lingers—and so does the
human nature of holding onto something, even long after our mind tells us to change.
From Heart of Darkness, to Gone with the Wind, to Django Unchained, some of the most
popular media consumed at large—whether for critical, “educational” or entertainment
purposes, contains the romanticism and fetishism of violence towards Black bodies. This
is not to say that these histories should not be taught, but given the widespread learning
through colonial perspectives and popularity of consuming these images of violence
provides evidence for Afro-pessimism’s claims of society’s obsession with the
consumption of violence towards Black people. In utilizing certain language that is
reflective of this violent image, Afro-pessimism could be appropriated by the Western
psyche if not approached cautiously.

3.5

Double Consciousness and Afro-Pessimism

Thomas and Emeagwali also critique Afro-pessimism for generalizing certain movements
and theories and pushing certain ideas “aside”, so to speak. Thomas is right in his
concern that the thinkers of this group could partly be too disconnected from society to
throw away notions that many groups who have been subjugated still find useful. For
example, the #BlackLivesMatter movement and its founders have clear roots in LGBTQ
and feminist movements as well as advocating for socialist ideals that could be
considered Marxist. They are still are able to prioritize Black issues while keeping
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relational ties towards these other marginalized subjectivities. 5 That being said, work on
Afro-pessimism (“Afro pessimism” ((unhyphenated)) continue to branch from the main
doctrine in certain ways, addressing some of the critiques already addressed. In “Afro
pessimism,” Lewis R. Gordon, Annie Menzel, George Shulman and Jasmine Syedullah
begin by differentiating their “Afro pessimism” from the hyphenated “Afro-pessimissm”
of Wilderson and Douglass:
What Baldwin and Cullors make clear is that pessimism is most powerful as an
unrelenting political process of coming back to life, beginning to feel one
another’s humanity. What my students who are taking up the work of Afropessimism are in most need of new ways to put their pessimism to work, to come
together and collectively counteract the mind-numbing soul-crushing isolation
centuries of antiblack racism have waged on our humanity. We need not fear
falling short. The more we ‘‘fail,’’ the stronger we rise to try again armed with the
alchemy of despair. What we need are stories and speeches, and spaces that
moves us from abjection toward that fertile ground of self-transformation one can
only find in the witness of another. (113)
An entire premise of what is proposed by Wilderson and contemporaries is still present in
the notion of “Afro pessimism” (unhyphenated): the presence of violence from Slavery is
present. A difference between Afro pessimism and Afro-pessimism lies in the way that
both movements are being used. Douglass and Wilderson radicalize the notion of

5

From the manifesto on blacklivesmatter.com: https://blacklivesmatter.com/what-we-believe/
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pessimism in order to, in some ways, shock the reader into recognizing the dire need for
political and social change. In doing so, they forgo the possibility of personal healing in
favour of revolutionizing thought. In Scarry’s description, the victim of violence is able
to heal after going through various stages. To be more precise in the article “The
Violence of Presence: metaphysics in a blackened world”, three such stages are
described:
a narrative progression from equilibrium to disequilibrium. And the first of two
stages in the narrative progression holds forth the promise of a third stage:
equilibrium restored; a closure stage--healing, or what we might call metaphysical
renewal: the reinstation of objects and their properties, space and time, cause and
effect (121).
This description seems similar to understandings of trauma—despite the kinds or
variations it is mainly a one-dimensional trajectory that leads to a place of healing.
Douglass and Wilderson argue that a Black person does not go through these stages in
terms of individual “experience”. In “Afro pessimism” however, pessimism is used as a
method of “self-transformation”. In a sense, this is revolutionary by simply allowing the
students to be “pessimistic” about the “soul-crushing isolation centuries of antiblack
racism have waged”. In Chapter One of the thesis, Sarah Ahmed’s work
“Multiculturalism and the Promise of Happiness” was taken up as an example of the way
in which “happiness” and “multiculturalism” have become value systems enforced in
capitalist societies. Ultimately these value systems attempt to force communities to
experience their history and form an identity in a way that does not disturb the rest of
society. “Pessimism”, however, is not a value system that can be enforced. There is not a
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goal that is necessarily achieved by despair but rather the possibility of what can
organically arise, especially in a collective setting as suggested in “Afro pessimism”.
The authors of “Afro pessimism” describe themselves and their students as “armed with
the alchemy of despair”. While keeping the same foundation as Wilderson and Douglass
of an inherent presence of violence, the writing here reflects a closer connection to Du
Bois. To describe the despair of the legacy of slavery as an “alchemy” is reflective of Du
Bois using the term “Seventh Son” in his description of double consciousness: they both
use metaphors of mythical elements (Du Bois 9). Both metaphors could take on two
possible meanings. In the context we have been using thus far, the use of the idea of a
magic or the supernatural implies the individual possessing a special ability, such as
insight. In many cultures the goal of the “science” of alchemy was to turn metal into gold
or to create an elixir of immortality. The idea of the “unrelenting political process of
coming back to life, beginning to feel one another’s humanity” uses the language of this
supernatural transformation. In light of the “social death”, a “coming back to life” ,
something Wilderson and Douglass claim cannot happen so long as the white supremacist
paradigm of Humanism persists, it is possible the “alchemy of despair” is a way to
(jokingly) refute their argument by miraculously overcoming this “impossibility”.
However, there could too be a notion of cynicism in the use of these metaphors. The
goals of alchemy were always out of reach no matter how many times they were pursued.
The goals of antiracism similarly have yet to be reached and the authors may be noting
that despite the progress made in self-transformation, systemic political change is
necessary.
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Double consciousness too can be read as a kind of despair, despite holding the divergent
potential meaning as a “gift”. Thus far, I have mainly conflated the experience of double
consciousness to a singular person—the alienation of that person, the objectification, to
quote Gilroy their existence “inside and outside conventions” (Gilroy 73). Du Bois poses
double consciousness in terms of a singular body in The Souls of Black Folk: “two
warring ideals in one dark body” (9). Of course Du Bois is not literally referring to one
singular body, or even necessarily a sole Black body, but analogizing (to borrow from
Gilroy) a “diasporic or hemispheric, sometimes global and occasionally universalist”
experience (Gilroy 127). Yet for a collective experience as adapted by thinkers such as
Gilroy, Du Bois still emphasizes that it is the individual’s “dogged strength alone [that]
keeps it from being torn asunder”, (the “it” referring to the body) which implies double
consciousness is very much a solitary situation. (Du Bois 9). The solitude and collective
elements of double consciousness are already expressed in various forms of expression
by Black artists and thinkers. The article “Afro Pessimism” claims that a transformation
can occur only in “the witness of another”. If this is so, more space could be created in
the academic world (in the proper framework without falling into concerns previously
discussed) that allow students to not only engage—but be armed with despair, pessimism
and double consciousness, as is already being done by the writers of “Afro Pessimism”.
The idea of resignation was brought up earlier in regards to Murillo’s notion of a Black
individual having “no life at all” and Fanon’s notion of “not existing”. It is also taken up
in “Afro Pessimism” from Gordan, Menzal, Shulman and Syedulla in regards to
Kierkegaard:
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In existential terms, then, many ancestors of the African diaspora embodied what
Søren Kierkegaard calls an existential paradox. All the evidence around them
suggested failure and the futility of hope. They first had to make a movement of
infinite resignation – that is, resigning themselves to their situation. Yet they must
simultaneously act against that situation. Kierkegaard called this seemingly
contradictory phenomenon ‘‘faith,’’ but that concept relates more to a relationship
with a transcendent, absolute being, which could only be established by a ‘‘leap,’’
as there are no mediations or bridge. (109-110)
It is interesting that Kierkegaard also theorized the idea of a kind of “pessimism” in
resignation. The contradiction of resigning oneself to the situation but also acting against
it is similar to the way to the way Fanon expresses the contradiction of being consider
morally inferior but also at the receiving end of violence (Fanon 174). As Fanon’s
scenario ends in a kind of destruction, alluding to the idea that before the “leap” can be
made structural political changes must be made. Fanon’s use of the sad fate of Bigger
Thomas from Native Son can be used as an example of a “leap” without a bridge (Fanon
118). He implies in this scenario, the only action possible is the one that “answers the
world’s expectations” (ibid). In other words, Bigger has the illusion of action, or the
illusion of free will.

3.6

Richard Wright and Double Consciousness

In Chapter Two, I discussed Richard Wright’s Native Son in regards to the character of
Bigger Thomas and the manifestation of double consciousness in affect and in Fanon’s
Black Skins, White Masks. Certainly some of the book’s topics seem that they were meant
to be read in an Afro-pessimistic light, such as the question of subjectivity and the role of
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violence. I argue that Bigger does not “become” violent as the violence had already been
present, and I believe Afro-pessimists would agree. Yet the subjectivity of Bigger
demands a bigger question be asked of the implications of Afro-pessimism, and by
default, of double consciousness. I already discussed the limitations to Bigger’s
“freedom” in chapter Two, which seemed aligned with the idea of the “social death”.
Now, using the figure of Richard Wright himself I will look further at how existentialism
influenced him and his ideas on “freedom”—determining where double consciousness
and freedom intersect.
In The Black Atlantic, Paul Gilroy recounts Wright’s life, in a similar manner to the way
he recounts Du Bois’ life. Like Du Bois, after achieving immense success in the United
States after the publishing of his book, Wright traveled extensively, both to Europe and
Africa. Also like Du Bois, Wright notes that his travels had a massive impact on his point
of view, claiming, for example, that “[the] break from the U.S. was more than a
geographical change. It was a break with my former attitudes” (Qtd in Gilroy 165).
Describing how he was always occupied with thinking about the “problem” of Western
society and the relation of Black people (and other people of colour) to it, Wright refers
to the idea of double consciousness as a “dreadful objectivity” (he referred to it as
“double vision” as well) (ibid). The realism of Native Son certainly depicts this dreadful
objectivity with unadorned clarity.
Reading further into Wright’s life however, the ambiguity of his beliefs and extent of his
influences are often overlooked. Wright was politically active as a Marxist while also
being a sophisticated critic of Marxism. He explored a wide variety of European
philosophers throughout his life and travels (159). In relation to modernity, Gilroy writes
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that: “For Wright the decisive break in western consciousness which modernity identifies
was defined by the collapse of a religious understanding of the world” (160). This
definition of modernity does not directly relate the time period of modernity to Slavery as
is done by Gilroy, however, it is notable that Wright looked backed on understanding this
time period.
One important figure that also influenced Wright was Kierkegaard. Gilroy retells, not
something written by Wright on Kierkegaard, but rather a personal experience which
potentially says more than any analysis. He recalls on page 159 a story where a man
named C.L.R. James went to visit Wright and his family in France. James saw that
Wright was reading many books by Kierkegaard, and claimed that everything he read in
Kierkegaard he had already learned from experience (159). Gilroy goes on to explain:
James suggests that Wright’s apparently intuitive foreknowledge of the issues
raised by Kierkegaard was not intuitive at all. It was an elementary product of his
historical experiences as a black growing up in the Unites States between the
wars: “What [Dick] was telling me was that he was a black man in the United
States and that gave him an insight into what today is the universal opinion and
attitude of the modern personality (emphasis added). (159)
Wright grew up during a time of great change in America; for himself personally, his
childhood was defined by constantly moving across the South. It was here Wright was
constantly facing obstacles and racism. In the late 1920s, he joined the “Great Migration”
and moved to Chicago, joining many others who moved to mid-Western cities for better
economic opportunities during this time. Moving to a big city may be what is referred to
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as giving him an “insight…of the modern personality”. Kierkegaard’s idea of the
“modern” stems from the loss of individuality and a move towards crowds and
“sameness” (Kierkegaard 61). As mentioned, Wright was an active Marxist and Chicago
was where he worked with a white communist group, serving likely his inspiration for the
characters of Mary Dalton and Jan in Native Son. The idea of “sameness” comes out in
Wright’s description of the city in Native Son and may be inspired by Wright’s time
there. For Bigger, the city is not a place of opportunity and excitement, he walks around
seeing the city described by Wright as cold, grey walls, the same white faces on build
boards, “mechanical” (Wright 14-15). Wright, whether intentionally or not took a “leap
of faith” in a Kierkegaardian sense. While he struggled with his own image of West, he
decided to act by moving move abroad.
In his writings on double consciousness, Wright’s “black subject is internally divided by
cultured affiliation, citizenship, and the demands of national and racial identity” (161).
To Gilroy, this demonstrates a difference from Du Bois’ original idea because Wright
focuses more on “unconscious aspects” rather than then Du Bois’ idea of “two warring
souls in one black body” (161). That being said, inspired by Nietzsche, Gilroy believes
that Wright’s conception of “double consciousness” or “double vision” (without
considering it purely hindrance or advantage) was similar to Du Bois’ in the idea of
“perspectival ways of knowing” (161). Furthermore, Wright also used the idea of
doubling or doubleness to describe a “splitting process” (162). However in both his
personal journey to know himself along with his challenges to reconcile his views he
came to see black consciousness in neither a necessarily “pessimistic” or “optimistic”
way:
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In Wright’s mature position, [black people are] no longer just America’s
metaphor but as a central symbol in the psychological, cultural, and political
systems of the West as a whole. (159)
Though highlighting the specific position in this quote of blackness, he is inclusive-- he
connects the United States with the broader network of nations with roots this history.
Like Afro-pessimists, Du Bois, Gilroy, and Fanon, though taking different routes, each
take on different modes of thought that recentralizes Black folks into a grand narrative.
The controversy and discussion about Afro-pessimism (and Afro pessimism) will surely
evolve in the upcoming years. The reader may agree or not agree with the situating of
subjectivities (or lack of) and use of language in this movement, or feel it is not their
position to comment. Gilroy showed—carefully—how understanding of modernity and
post modernity is largely based on the cognitive dissonance of the erasure of Black
culture and history, and most importantly Black lives. The pain and injustice of this
history is still very much present. So, the irreverence, urgency and abrasiveness built into
the tone of Afro-pessimism, while not taken well by some, is understandable. Relating
this movement to figures such as Wright and Du Bois is important to maintain historical
foundations rooted fully in the history of the system of slavery and racial dynamics in the
America, but also a wider global perspective. The spirit and poetry from these authors
can help guide the academic community (and wider society) as it interrogates its own
systemic racism. It is also important, however, to relate Du Bois’ double consciousness to
the Afro-pessimist movement (or other movements for that matter) not only as a tool. The
gift of “double consciousness” that Du Bois passed on contests the postmodern tenet that
that grand narratives can no longer exist.
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